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ABSTRACT
Multiple schemes th at utilize probabilistic packet marking (PPM ) have been
proposed to deal with Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by reconstructing
their attack graphs and identifying the attack sources.
In the first part of this dissertation, we present our contribution to the family
of PPM-based schemes for Internet Protocol (IP) traceback. Our proposed approach,
Prediction-Based Scheme (PBS), consists of marking and traceback algorithms that
reduce scheme convergence times by dealing with the problems of d ata loss and
incomplete attack graphs exhibited by previous PPM-based schemes.
Compared to previous PPM-based schemes, the PBS marking algorithm ensures
th at traceback is possible with about 54% as many total network packets, while the
traceback algorithm takes about 33% as many marked packets for complete attack
path construction.
In the second part of this dissertation, we tackle the problem of scheme
evaluation and comparison across discrepant network topologies. Previous research in
this area has overlooked the influence of network topology on scheme performance and
often utilized disparate and simplistic network abstractions to evaluate and compare
these schemes.
Our approach to this problem involves the evaluation of selected PPM-based
schemes across a set of 60 Intemet-like topologies and the adaptation of the network

m otif approach to provide a common ground for comparing the schemes’ performances
in different network topologies.

This approach allows us to determine the level

of structural similarity between network topologies and consequently enables the
comparison of scheme performance even when the schemes are implemented on
different topologies.
Furthermore, we identify three network-dependent factors that affect different
PPM-based schemes uniquely causing a variation in, and discrepancy between, scheme
performance from one network to another.
Results indicate th a t scheme performance is dependent on the network upon
which it is implemented, i.e. the value of the PPM-based schemes’ convergence times
and their rankings vary depending on the underlying network topology. We show how
the identified network factors contribute, individually and collectively, to the scheme
performance in large-scale networks. Additionally, we identify five superfamilies from
the 60 considered networks and find th at networks within a superfamily also exhibit
similar PPM -based scheme performance. To complement our results, we present an
analytical model showing a link between scheme performance in any superfamily, and
the motifs exhibited by the networks in that superfamily.
Our work highlights a need for multiple network evaluation of network protocols.
To this end, we dem onstrate a method of identifying structurally similar network
topologies among which protocol performance is potentially comparable. Our work
also presents an effective way of comparing general network protocol performance in
which the protocol is evaluated on specific representative networks instead of an entire
set of networks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a form of attack in which legitimate users
of a service or resource are intentionally denied access to it by attackers. In the context
of networking and computing, DoS attacks typically take the form of a targeted server
being flooded with bogus Internet traffic causing overloading and, finally, making it
unavailable for its legitimate users [14]. In DoS attacks, the bogus traffic originates
from a single source while a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack originates
from multiple sources. One popular approach to tackle this problem is Internet
Protocol (IP) traceback in which the source of the attack is traced and identified using
the traffic th at constituted the attack.
One technique for realizing IP traceback for flooding style DDoS attacks is
Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM ) [38], which is the basis for multiple similar
schemes, hereafter referred to as PPM -based Schemes. Each PPM -based scheme
consists of two processes: a marking algorithm, and a traceback algorithm. The
marking algorithm ensures that network routers embed their own identities in packets
randomly selected from all the network traffic th at the routers process [38]. In the
event of an attack, the victim executes the traceback algorithm which uses the router
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identity markings present in the received attack packets to reconstruct the attack
graph - the paths taken by attack traffic - and establish its sources [39].

1.1 A Novel PPM -B ased Scheme
Space constraints in network packet headers, where the router identities are
typically embedded, leads to a problem of data loss with previous marking schemes.
The d ata loss problem is experienced when routers randomly select packets th at
already have upstream router information and re-mark those packets in the process.
This typically results in the victim receiving fewer packets with upstream router
identities than packets with downstream router information. Any limitation in marked
packets from any portion of the attack path in tu rn restricts how quickly the attack
graph can be reconstructed and attack sources identified.
Another problem with previous PPM -based schemes is displayed in their
reconstruction algorithms. Typical reconstruction algorithms only utilize attack traffic
to reconstruct the attack graph. This reliance on attack traffic means th a t if the
victim does not receive any packets with markings from any particular router in the
attack path, the algorithm fails to reconstruct a complete and accurate attack graph.
This poses a problem particularly with attacks experienced over a short duration.
These problems with the marking and reconstruction algorithms make PPMbased schemes an infeasible approach to IP traceback particularly with DDoS attacks.
They typically require the victim to receive a large number of attack packets in order
to trace one attacker, which translates to poor tim e and space complexity [51], and
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this problem is magnified when there is a need to trace more than one attacker, as is
the case in DDoS attacks [49].
In the first part of this dissertation, we present our contribution to the family of
PPM-based schemes: the prediction-based scheme (PBS). PBS consists of independent
marking and reconstruction algorithms designed to overcome the above mentioned
problems.

The PBS marking algorithm can be used with other reconstruction

algorithms and the PBS reconstruction algorithm can be used with other marking
algorithms. Our marking algorithm ensures th a t the victim receives packets with
router identities from all parts of an attack path with equal frequency. To achieve
this, our marking algorithm prohibits the re-marking of packets and compensates for
any missed marking opportunities. On the other hand, our reconstruction algorithm
uses legitimate traffic collected before or after an attack to complement attack traffic
in reconstructing the attack graph.
Results show that the PBS marking algorithm only requires about 54% of the
total packets necessary for traceback to be possible compared to PPM. Additionally,
our traceback algorithm extension requires as low as 33% of the usual number of
marked packets for a complete graph construction in some cases.

Dealing with

multiple attackers is therefore more practical using PBS than other PPM -based
schemes. Furthermore, PBS shows that missing information from routers in the attack
path does not, as it previously did, present a dead-end in traceback.

4

1.2 Network Dependence of PPM -Based Schemes
A lot of intensive research has gone into designing PPM-based schemes that are
computationally more efficient and robust than the original PPM [9, 38]. However, little
work has gone into identifying network dependent factors that affect the performance
of PPM-based schemes in large-scale networks. In fact, most simulations are carried
out on disparate tree-structured topologies which exhibit a single path from an attacker
to the victim. Analytical models derived from these topologies are then used to predict
the performance of the schemes when deployed in a large-scale network such as the
Internet [49, 30, 52, 44]. However, tree-structured underlying topologies ignore the
prevalence of load balancing routers which have the effect of utilizing alternative
routes between traffic sources and destinations [2]. This makes it difficult to predict
scheme performance in a well-connected large-scale network without implementing
the scheme on th at network. Additionally, since the schemes are implemented on
disparate networks, it is difficult to compare the performance of different schemes
directly.
Consequently, there is a need to study the influence of network topology on PPMbased scheme performance. There is also a need to provide some classification criteria
for large-scale networks within which scheme performance is possibly comparable, i.e.
to be able to predict th a t two networks would exhibit similar scheme performance
w ithout implementing the scheme in both networks. Such a study would reveal
the network topology factors th at should be considered when designing PPM -based
schemes for large scale networks such as the Internet. The study would also enable
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researchers to make more informed predictions about scheme performance in large-scale
networks without having to implement the scheme in the networks.
In the second part of this dissertation, we present such a study. We identify
three network dependent factors that affect scheme performance in large-scale networks.
These factors include the average shortest path length, the overlapping of attack paths,
and the occurrence of network motifs in attack graphs. Using specific attack graphs,
we show the influence of each factor on selected PPM-based schemes. We then use 60
Internet-like networks to show how all the identified factors collectively contribute
to the performance of PPM -based schemes in more realistic scenarios. The set of
networks is selected to encompass a variety of mathematical models used by researchers
to create networks th a t adequately describe the structure of the Internet. We also
adapt the network m otif technique to identify structurally similar groups of networks
- referred to as superfamilies - from within the set of considered networks [34, 33].
Results show that PPM-based scheme performance is dependent on the network
on which it is implemented. In fact, even the ranking of performance changes from one
network to another, i.e. the best performing scheme in one network is not necessarily
the best performing scheme in another network. Our results show how the identified
factors contribute, both individually and collectively, to the PPM -based schemes’
performance in large scale networks. Additionally, we find th a t when the networks
are arranged in superfamilies, the networks within each superfamily exhibit similar
scheme performance despite being created using different mathematical models and
param eter values. Furthermore, we find th at actual scheme performance far exceeds
its theoretical upper bounds as derived from previous analytical models.
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To complement our results, we present an analytical model that shows how the
motifs exhibited by a network topology possibly affect the performance of PPM-based
schemes in that network. This model explains the link between network superfamilies
and scheme performance th at is observed in our results. We also analyze and perform
simulations on three extra networks directly derived from the Internet as described by
the Caida project [42].
This work raises questions about the network dependency of other network
protocols. Does the performance of other network protocols also vary from one type
of network to another? If so, how can researchers guarantee th at just because one
protocol performs better than another in a given simulation network it will perform
better in all other simulation networks or even in the Internet? This work and these
questions therefore encourage multiple network evaluation of network protocols. To
this end, our work demonstrates a method of identifying structurally similar Internet
like networks among which any protocol’s performance is potentially comparable. If a
protocol is proven to be linked to network superfamilies, network evaluation need only
be done on representatives of each superfamily as opposed to all possible networks.

1.3 Dissertation Contributions
In this section, we outline the contributions of this dissertation.
1. An analysis of PPM -based schemes is presented in Section 2.2 in which we
extensively discuss the differences among selected existing PPM-based schemes.
In particular, we discuss the differences among their underlying topologies and
why the current approaches to network simulation are inadequate.
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2. We present a novel PPM -based scheme called the Prediction-Based Scheme
(PBS) in C hapter 3. The PBS scheme consists of independent marking and
reconstruction algorithms that deal with data loss problems exhibited by previous
schemes and exhibit comparatively lower convergence times.
3. We evaluate and compare the performance of selected schemes on an extensive
set of Internet-like topologies and show how scheme performance, and even the
ranking of performance, changes from one network to another. Our results show
that scheme evaluation on a single network is not only inadequate but misleading
as well.
4. We identify three network-dependent factors that affect scheme performance and
contribute to the discrepancy in scheme performance exhibited among various
networks in Section 4.2. We show the individual influence of these factors on
scheme performance empirically.
5. Network motifs and subgraph ratio profiles are employed to identify superfam
ilies in a set of topologies. Each superfamily consists of networks th a t have
similar local graph structure even when the networks are derived from different
mathematical models.
6. We show a link between network motifs and the performance of PPM -based
schemes analytically in Chapter 5. Our analytical model explains the influence
of the network motifs on scheme performance.
7. We demonstrate a network clustering process that can be used to group Internet
like networks into superfamilies according to their structural similarity in Section
4.3. This allows researchers to evaluate network protocols on a smaller set

8
of representative networks as opposed to a large set of all possible simulation
networks.

1.4 Definitions and Terminology
In this section, we discuss terms th a t are central to the discussion in this
dissertation. Some of these terms are described further where first encountered in this
dissertation.

Marking Scheme: An approach to IP traceback that consists of a marking algorithm
and a traceback algorithm. The marking scheme allows a victim of a flooding style
DDoS attack to identify the attack sources. In the context of this dissertation, we
use the term marking scheme to refer to the marking schemes th at are based on the
technique of Probabilistic Packet Marking introduced in [38] by Savage et al.

Marking Algorithm: An algorithm implemented at network routers th a t ensures
each router randomly selects packets from its input traffic stream and embeds th at
router’s identity into the identification field of the packet header before forwarding
those packets onto their destinations. Because the marking algorithm is the primary
component of the marking scheme, the marking algorithm is sometimes referred to as
the marking scheme by researchers.

Reconstruction Algorithm: An algorithm implemented at the victim th a t uses
the routers’ identities embedded in any received attack traffic packets to build a graph
representing the routers and edges traversed by attack traffic from its sources to the
victim. The reconstruction algorithm is also referred to as the traceback algorithm.
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Convergence time: The average number of network packets th a t a victim would
have to receive during a DDoS attack in order to reconstruct the complete attack
graph successfully and consequently identify the attack sources.

Packet: A network packet is a basic unit of data being transmitted across a network
such as the Internet. It consists of a packet header which contains control information,
and a payload which contains the user’s data. In PPM-based schemes, router identities
are potentially embedded in the identification field of the packet header.

Attack path: A collection of nodes and edges linking a single attack source to the
victim. It represents the path that the traffic from that source traversed in order to
arrive at the victim.
A tta c k g ra p h : A collection of nodes and edges linking all the sources of a DDoS
attack to the victim. The attack graph represents all the routers and edges that were
involved in forwarding the attack traffic from its sources to the victim.

Node: A component of an attack path/graph that represents any device operating at
the Internet layer of the T C P /IP model or the network layer of the OSI model (e.g.
routers, switches, hosts).

Edge: A component of an attack path/graph th at represents a direct link between
nodes. Two nodes are connected by an edge if Internet traffic can be transm itted
directly between them without being forwarded by any intermediate nodes.

Upstream router: Given that the attack traffic flows from an attacker to the victim,
an upstream router refers to any router in an attack path that is located closer to the
attacker. The term is typically used in comparison to a downstream router.
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Downstream router: In contrast to the upstream router, a downstream router
refers to any router in an attack path that is closer to the victim.

Subgraph: In the context of this dissertation, a subgraph refers to a connected graph
which is a subset of a larger network. The subgraphs considered in this work consist
of four nodes with undirected edges.

Network motif: A network motif is any subgraph in a given network th a t is
significantly prevalent. The subgraph’s level of prevalence is derived by comparing its
frequency in the network with its frequency in similar randomized networks.

Subgraph ratio profiles: A form of “signature” for a network th a t represents the
relative frequency of a given set of subgraphs in th at network. Networks with similar
subgraph frequencies for all considered subgraphs will typically exhibit similar subgraph
ratio profiles (SRPs).

Superfamily: A collection of networks th a t exhibit similar SRPs. Networks origi
nating from different fields of science or created using different mathematical models
could potentially belong to the same superfamily. In contrast, networks created using
the same m athem atical models or originating from the same field of science could
potentially belong to different super families.

Alternative path/route: More than a single route between a source and a target.
In the context of an attack graph, an alternative route suggests that the attack traffic
from a single source traversed more than a single path to arrive at the victim, i.e. one
portion of the traffic traversed one path, and another portion traversed a different
path. In the context of a subgraph, alternative paths means th a t it is possible to
select two nodes from a subgraph, between which exists more than one unique path.
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If such a subgraph were situated within an attack graph, th a t attack graph would
exhibit alternative paths.

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, we discuss various PPM -based schemes and highlight the
weaknesses th a t are addressed in this dissertation. In C hapter 3, we present the
Prediction-Based Scheme and results showing how it compares to selected PPM-based
schemes in different attack graph scenarios. We discuss the network dependency
of PPM -based schemes, the identified network dependent factors, and the network
classification approach herein implemented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we discuss the
traditional analytical model, and present our proposed extensions to th a t model.
C hapter 6 contains a study of our simulations, and the results of the network
dependency study are discussed in Chapter 7. We then present concluding thoughts
in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 A Background on PPM -Based Schemes
The field of IP traceback consists of a variety of schemes designed to find the
origin of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Most of these schemes have experienced
limited success in the industry as evidenced by their low levels of deployment by
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) [54] and yet DDoS attacks are still a prevalent
problem today [45, 18, 5, 6, 7]. Schemes have to be designed with an eye on their
deployment feasibility in order to encourage ISPs to use them. IP traceback schemes
can be categorized according to attributes such as a principle, processing mode, or
location [9]. When classified according to principle, IP traceback schemes fall into one
of two broad categories: those th at employ logging and those th at employ marking.
In marking schemes, some or all the routers along the path between an attacker
and victim (attack path) send information about themselves or adjacent edges in the
path to the victim. When the victim obtains sufficient information, the entire attack
path can be reconstructed [9]. This information can be sent as an extra packet, as
in ICM P based traceback, or embedded within the packet itself, as in Probabilistic
Packet Marking (PPM) based techniques.
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PPM-based schemes consist of a marking scheme and a reconstruction procedure,
and are based on the assumption that large amounts of traffic are used in a (D)DoS
attack [38].

In their original work, Savage et al.

[38] propose th a t the PPM

marking scheme is employed at all times in all the routers in the network, while
the reconstruction procedure is employed by the victim in the event of an attack.
The marking scheme ensures th a t every router embeds its own identity in packets
randomly selected from the packets the routers process during routing. Since a large
number of packets is received in an attack, there is a considerable chance that a victim
will have received packets with markings from all the routers th a t were traversed
by the attack packets. The victim then employs the reconstruction procedure which
uses the received marked attack packets to map out the attack graph - the paths
from the victim to the attackers. The total number of received packets required to
trace the attackers is referred to as the scheme’s convergence time. One advantage
of PPM -based schemes is th a t they do not require much ISP involvement and are
effective for DoS attacks. However, they typically do not scale well for DDoS attacks
and are susceptible to spoofed markings [9]. The family of PPM-based schemes consist
of the many adjustm ents to the primitive form of PPM th at attem pt to tackle its
weaknesses as well as improve its strengths [51, 49, 39].
One example of a PPM-based scheme is the Tabu Marking Scheme (TMS) [30].
The author points out that PPM is prone to information loss as a result of re-marking.
Re-marking occurs when a router randomly selects a packet which already has marking
information from an upstream router, and consequently overwrites this information.
TMS tackles this problem by ensuring that their marking scheme forfeits the marking
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opportunity in the event th at the randomly selected packet contains previous marking
information. As a result, they report lower convergence times than PPM for DDoS
attacks.
Another one of these improvements is with the Advanced and Authenticated
Marking schemes (AMS) presented by Song et al. [39]. These marking schemes support
incremental deployment, which means th at they are still successful even if they are
not implemented on all the routers in the network. They also scale better to handle
DDoS attacks because of lower computation overhead. They improve efficiency by
utilizing a predetermined or previously obtained map of upstream routers. W ith this
information, the traceback scheme does not require as many packets for traceback and
therefore tracing DDoS attacks is more computationally feasible.
Wong et al. [49] present the Rectified Probabilistic Packet Marking (RPPM)
traceback algorithm to be used with the PPM. They point out that the reconstruction
procedure used in PPM -based schemes has an imprecise term ination condition.
Typically, the analytical model in [38] is used to predict how many packets are
required, but the model depends on the attack path length which is not known before
the reconstruction is complete. Because the convergence time is considerably less than
the total number of packets received during a typical attack, the victim is generally
sure th a t the attack graph will be complete after analyzing all the received packets.
However, a problem arises during short term attacks because the victim cannot tell if
extra unique edges would be identified by receiving more packets. The authors present
a mathematical formulation for a precise termination condition that enables complete
attack graph reconstruction within a user-specified level of confidence.
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In the next chapter of this dissertation, we present an alternative scheme
called Prediction-Based Scheme (PBS) which also avoids re-marking [26]. However,
in contrast to TMS, the PBS marking scheme ensures that the router information is
embedded in the next available packet if the randomly selected packet already has
marking information. The PBS marking scheme requires extra space cost of one bit
compared to PPM. Additionally, the reconstruction algorithm utilizes both legitimate
and attack traffic to reconstruct the attack graph. The PBS reconstruction algorithm
is an extension of the RPPM reconstruction algorithm in [49].
Many other schemes have been proposed to increase the efficiency of PPM in
different ways e.g. [51, 36, 23, 52]. Some of these schemes are presented in Table
2.1. The table compares our approach to nine other PPM -based schemes in terms
of features such as convergence time, underlying topologies, incremental deployment,
re-marking, and upstream graph.
The convergence time refers to mathematical analysis for a single path scenario
under uniform marking probability p and path length d. The expressions capture how
many packets it would typically take to identify the entire path linking the victim to
an attacker.
The feature incremental deployment refers to whether the scheme would be
successful if the marking scheme is deployed on a fraction of the routers in the
network. Only a few schemes explicitly state th a t they would be successful when
partially deployed [38, 39, 51, 23]. Incremental deployment means partial attack
graph reconstruction is possible even when some ISP’s in the attack graph have not
implemented the marking scheme on their routers.

T a b le 2.1: A comparison of 10 different PPM -based schemes over their features. These features include convergence tim e,
whether they require prior knowledge of the upstream graph to correctly identify attackers, whether they can be incrementally
deployed, and underlying topology. The convergence tim e expressions presented in the table are for a DoS scenario assuming no
prior knowledge of the network topology while the underlying topology shows the network topologies used in th e evaluation
of th e schemes. These topologies include single path, single attacker (SP/SA ), single path, multiple attacker (SP/M A ), and
multiple path, multiple attacker (M P/M A)
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Re-marking refers to whether the marking scheme at a router perm its the
overwriting of the previous edge or router information in a packet. The majority of the
considered schemes permit re-marking of packets [38, 39, 51, 49, 36, 23, 52]. The packet
selection process at the routers th at implement these schemes is completely random,
which means th at it is possible for a router to randomly select and consequently
re-mark a packet th at already has marking information from an upstream router.
Upstream graph refers to whether a scheme requires a previously obtained
map of the network to successfully trace the specific path taken by attack traffic.
Some of the works address how such a map can be obtained to aid in attack graph
reconstruction [39, 51, 26]. Access to the map of a network allows for significantly
improved performance since sections of the attack path can be inferred as opposed to
being identified explicitly.
The underlying topology shows the different network topologies th at are used
for simulation purposes in those papers. The results from these topologies are used
to provide an indication of how the schemes would perform if implemented in the
Internet. More discussion of this feature is provided in a subsequent section.
The schemes considered therein are by no means an exhaustive study of all the
PPM-based schemes in existence. However, the collection of schemes is large enough
to show the discrepancy in underlying topologies, which makes them inadequate for
direct comparison of scheme performance.
It is im portant to point out th a t PPM -based schemes are not the only
proposed approaches to IP traceback [9, 22]. Alternatives include packet logging
[29], specialized routing [40], Internet control message protocol (ICMP) traceback
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[10], deterministic packet marking [8], and hybrid approaches which combine different
traceback techniques [53] or combine traceback with anomaly detection [50].
We have been able to publish various portions of the work in this dissertation
in [26, 27, 28].

2.2 Underlying Topologies and PPM -Based Schemes
In this section, we discuss the relationship between the underlying topologies
used for simulation purposes and the PPM-based schemes. It contains the background
research considered for the topology dependence study presented in the second part of
this dissertation.

2.2.1 A Comparison of Previous Underlying Topologies
Ideally, the performance of a network protocol such as a PPM-based traceback
scheme would be evaluated on either the Internet itself, or a topology exactly like
it. By simulating the schemes on an underlying topology, researchers are able to
understand the performance of those schemes. The simulations also allow researchers
to validate any derived analytical models and show how any scheme would perform in
a network such as the Internet.
However, because the Internet is enormous, dynamic and heterogeneous,
attem pts to carry out empirical protocol evaluation are expensive and inflexible [13].
As a result, researchers resort to simulations implemented on underlying topologies
which are considered to be simplified abstractions of the topology of the Internet
[13, 41, 20, 32]. In this case, an underlying topology is represented by a graph G (v,e)
consisting of nodes v and edges e where the nodes represent either devices with routing
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capability or end hosts. An edge between any two nodes means th a t traffic can be
directly transm itted between those two devices [13].
It is im portant to point out the difference between a network topology and a
routing topology and how this difference affects our work. A network topology consists
of all nodes in a network and all the edges between those nodes. It represents all
possible routes th at network traffic can use to get from any point in the network to
any other point. On the other hand, a routing topology consists of the nodes and edges
th at traffic typically traverses to get from one point in the network to another. Since
the routing topology only captures typical traffic routes, it is a subset of the network
topology. In this section, we show that while traditional underlying topology choices
are appropriate for routing topologies, they make inadequate network topologies.
Using a routing topology as an underlying topology assumes th a t attack traffic will
always take typical traffic routes even under the duress th at a DDoS attack exposes
the network to.
A typical simulation is carried out as follows. During set up, the marking
algorithm is implemented in the nodes (routers) of the underlying topology. To
simulate the attack, packets are transmitted from one or more nodes (representing the
attackers) to one specific node (representing the victim). A reconstruction procedure
is then implemented at the victim to map out the attack graph Gact. The resulting
attack graph should consist of only the nodes and edges in the underlying topology
that were directly involved in transm itting the attack packets.
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As shown in Table 2.1, a variety of underlying topologies have been used to
evaluate the performance of PPM -based schemes. The underlying topologies used
range from simplistic to complex, as described below.
The single path, single attacker (SP/SA) is a simple topology consisting of a
single attacker node sending packets along a single path to a single victim node. The
length of the path varies with each work ranging from 3 hops to 32 hops [38, 49, 26, 44].
This setup is used to simulate the performance of PPM schemes during a flooding
style DoS attack.
The Single Path, Multiple Attacker (SP/M A), and Multiple Path, Multiple
Attacker (MP/MA) topologies consist of multiple sources of attack traffic to simulate
a DDoS attack. The SP/M A simulates a unique topology in which all the attackers
are located at different distances from the victim but all along a single path [26]. The
M P/M A simulates a more general topology where each attacker has a unique path
linking it to the victim node. In some cases, the paths are completely independent
[49], while in other cases, the paths merge closer to the victim [30, 49, 23, 26].
One unique M P/M A topology is a tree, e.g. a binary tree. In this case, the
attack graph is modeled as a tree with some or all of the leaves at a certain depth
representing the attack nodes, and the root of the tree representing the victim node
[30, 49, 23]. This setup ensures that different attack paths merge the closer they are
to the victim. As with SP/SA and SP/MA, there is only one path in the attack graph
from an attack node to the victim node.
Some authors have evaluated their schemes using actual data sets from the
Internet [39, 51, 36]. These include traceroute data sets from Lucent Bell labs in [39]
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and CAIDA’s skitter map in [51, 36]. These data sets are used to produce topologies
th a t are typically larger th an the simple topologies mentioned thus far and provide
better abstractions of the Internet structure. In this work, we have included three
complementary Caida networks into our network set to provide a form of comparison
for the rest of the network set.
One common feature with these underlying topologies is their tree-like structure.
A tree-structured topology Gtree exhibits a single path from any given attacker to the
victim. The choice of tree-structured topologies is based on the assumption th a t all
attack traffic from one attacker will take the same path to the victim. This assumption
is in turn based on the observation that Internet paths are largely invariant particularly
over short periods of time [37]. These assumptions have allowed researchers to simplify
the simulation process by ignoring the routing and load balancing capabilities of the
network and enforcing a predefined (or pre-observed) set of paths for attack traffic.
However, the prevalence of load balancing routers in the Internet today [2, 17] makes
the assumption of a tree-structured topology an unrealistic one. Augustin et al. report
th a t 39%-70% of the routes measured in [2] exhibit route fluttering as a result of
load balancing. Load balancing routers frequently forward traffic along alternative
paths in order to minimize cost to the network. Consequently, scheme performance in
tree-structured topologies, where all traffic from one source takes one path, cannot be
used as an indication of how those schemes would perform in Internet-like network
topologies.
During our initial evaluations of PBS, we considered two well-connected albeit
small networks [26]. In contrast to the tree-like networks (Gtf.ee) typically considered
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in PPM-based schemes, well-connected networks contain alternative routes between
attackers and any victim. Simulations carried out in well-connected networks, where
routers make routing decisions as well as marking decisions, more closely capture the
performance of the schemes if they were deployed in the Internet. In this work, we
follow up by considering a larger number of network models to investigate the marking
schemes.
We consider the models that have been shown to simulate the Internet topology
[13, 41, 46, 16, 47]. These models fall into three categories based on the Internet
properties th at they emphasize, namely degree-based models, structural models and
spatial models (cf. Figure 2.1). The emphasis of degree-based models is the degree
distribution of the nodes in an attem pt to recreate the power law observations in the
Internet [20, 47]. The structural models arrange the nodes to mimic the hierarchical
structure of the Internet, with Internet traffic being transm itted through routers
located within autonomous systems [13, 32]. The spatial models place emphasis on
the location of the nodes with any two nodes being connected only if they are within
a transmission range of each other [16]. The three categories of models are used to
create 60 Internet-like topologies which are then used to provide a clearer picture of
the performance of PPM-based schemes in an Internet-like environment.
Using mathematical models to create underlying topologies for simulation allows
us to link scheme performance to the structural characteristics exhibited by a category
of networks. For example, a pattern in scheme performance in the degree-based
networks (such as the Barabasi and Waxman networks) could be potentially linked to
the power law in the Internet. In contrast, a pattern in the structural networks (such
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as the Top-Down hierarchical networks) could be linked to the hierarchical structure
of the Internet. An actual Internet topology dataset would not lend itself easily to
such analysis because it exhibits all these characteristics and therefore attributing
scheme performance to one specific characteristic would be more difficult.
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d egree distributii
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e Intern
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F ig u re 2.1: Internet topology can be captured by a variety of models which
include spatial, structural and degree-based models. Each model emphasizes different
properties of the Internet and can be used to evaluate network protocols when employed
in the Internet. The nodes in these topologies represent devices operating at the
Internet layer of the T C P /IP model or the network layer of the OSI model (e.g.
routers, switches, hosts). Two nodes are connected by an edge if Internet traffic can
be directly transm itted between them without being forwarded by any intermediate
nodes.

Despite the convenience and prevalence of using mathematical models for the
Internet, we must point out that they do not provide a completely accurate description
of the Internet topology. The process of capturing and modeling the topology of the
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Internet is not only a complex process but is also an ongoing one with many unresolved
challenges, the details of which are beyond the scope of this dissertation. However,
the network set used in our work is sufficient for the purposes of comparing scheme
performance, and providing a benchmark for further studies about scheme dependence
on topologies.

2.2.2 Selecting Representative Marking Schemes
Table 2.1 shows th at the different schemes contain different features that help
to improve their performances in one way or another. Therefore, to facilitate the
comparison of the different marking schemes in our simulations, it is imperative
th at the schemes are evaluated on the same “level” . The level selected for the
uniform comparison of the schemes is their underlying algorithms. By considering the
underlying algorithm, we disregard environment specific features such as router identity
fragmentation, network dependent implementation details, and different confidence
levels in attack graph construction. Consequently, we are able to categorize the marking
schemes according to their underlying algorithms, and then select representative
schemes from each category for simulation purposes. Additionally, we do not consider
external factors such as complementary network traffic and traffic dynamics. As a
result of these adjustments, the obtained results should not be taken as an absolute
measure of the scheme performance in all networks, but rather used as a relative
measure between different schemes and/or different networks.
Despite their large number, PPM -based schemes have similar underlying
algorithms in their marking schemes. The underlying algorithm is responsible for how
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the packets, in which the router identities are embedded, are selected. For example,
the m ajority of the considered schemes exhibit underlying algorithms in which all
routers randomly select packets with equal probability p [38, 39, 51, 49, 36, 23, 52].
The schemes in this category are prone to re-marking. We refer to this category as
the re-marking category of PPM-based schemes. In the other category of schemes, the
routers’ packet selection process is only partially random. The underlying algorithms
in this category prohibit the overwriting of previous router information and as a
result exhibit performances th a t are notably different from the re-marking category
[44, 30, 26].
We select three representative marking schemes: PPM [38] to represent the
re-marking category, and TMS [30] and PBS [26] to represent the non-re-marking
category. The analytical models for these three schemes are markedly different from
each other, even for equal marking probability, because of the differences in the
schemes’ underlying marking algorithms, and yet representative of their respective
categories. The performance of any PPM-based scheme can therefore be compared to
either one of these schemes, or a combination of them.
Because of re-marking in PPM , the victim typically receives more markings
from close-by routers than from distant routers. The chance of receiving a marked
packet from a router I hops away is given by the geometric distribution expression
p( 1 —p)1" 1. This is because a received marked packet indicates that that packet was
selected by a router (with probability p), and not selected (with probability 1 —p)
by all Z—1 subsequent routers. The analysis for PPM can therefore be applied to
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any scheme where the markings from distant routers are rarer than markings from
close-by routers.
In TMS, the decision to forfeit a marking opportunity if the packet is previously
marked means that markings from routers distant from the victim are more prevalent
than markings from closer routers. The chance of receiving a marked packet from a
router I hops away is given by p (l - p)d~l where d is the attack path length. This is
because a received marked packet indicates that that packet was selected by a router
(with probability p), after not being selected (with probability 1 —p) by all d —I
previous routers. This analysis can be applied to all schemes in which markings from
distant routers are more prevalent than markings from close-by routers.
In contrast to TMS, the PBS marking scheme compensates for the missed
marking opportunities. Therefore, the chance of receiving a marking from a router I
hops from the victim is given by p for any router in the path. This analysis can be
applied to all schemes in which the markings from the routers are equally prevalent
regardless of their distance from the victim. Understanding the im pact of network
topology on these three schemes therefore provides an adequate basis to understand
the impact of network topology on other PPM-based schemes.

2.3 Using Subgraphs to Differentiate Networks
Milo et al. [34] introduce the concept of network motifs to compare arbitrary
network topologies.

In their seminal paper, network motifs are defined as the

significantly prevalent subgraphs exhibited by a network. By identifying 3-node
and 4-node motifs, it is possible to establish structural similarities among different
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networks ranging from electronic circuits, to neuron synaptic connections, to ecological
food webs, to world-wide web hyperlinks, e.t.c. They argue th at the network motifs
are the fundamental building blocks of the networks, and as such, different networks
can be compared by using them. Furthermore, the motifs are used to understand the
underlying functions that generate each network.
Milo et al. [33] follow up this work by using 3-node and 4-node subgraphs
to create “signatures” for different networks from different fields of science. The
signatures are based on the relative abundance or absence of the subgraphs which in
turn are evaluated by comparing those networks to randomized networks of the same
size and connectivity. These signatures, referred to as subgraph ratio profiles (SRPs),
are then compared among networks and used to assign the networks to superfamilies
based on their similarities. Networks in the same superfamily are understood to
exhibit similar underlying structure regardless of their generation principles or the
fields of science from which they came.
Network motifs and SRPs have since then been used to compare different
networks from fields such as social networks [55], neural networks [48], cooperative
networks [24], protein interaction networks [19], and gene-regulation networks [15].
Additionally, some work has been done in improving the time efficiency of the process
of counting network motifs [31]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
where the technique has been specifically adapted to identify the superfamilies in
Internet-like networks.

CHAPTER 3
PREDICTION-BASED SCHEME
3.1 Problem Statem ent and System M odel
The general process of tracing an attacker using PPM is outlined below.
1. Before an attack, a marking scheme / algorithm should be implemented in the
routers of a network. The marking algorithm allows each router to select a
packet in its processing queue and embeds its router identity in th a t packet
regularly.
2. During an attack, the victim collects all attack packets.
3. Either during or after the attack, the victim employs a traceback algorithm that
searches through the collected packets to find markings indicating what routers
(or edges) the packets traversed.
4. The traceback algorithm returns a graph showing how all the routers in the
attack path are connected to each other based on the received packet markings.
It returns a complete attack graph if all routers in the graph have been identified.

Implementation of a marking scheme is the primary step of the traceback
process, and the algorithm used for the marking affects the efficacy in which traceback
can be accomplished.
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An example is shown in Figure 3.1, in which there is a single attacker (Attacker
1) sending N i number of attack packets, along a path of d\ routers between the attacker
and the victim. We refer to this topology as the Single Path, Single Attacker (SP/SA)
topology throughout this paper. Each router in the attack path independently selects
whether to mark the packets going through it with probability p. It follows that there
is a probability (1 —p) that any packet going through a router in the path will not be
marked by th at router.
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Attacker 1 * - 0

( ~ ) Router i steps away from the victim on the
*Tj path between the victim and attacker j

Rdi-1,1

R. 1

Link between adjacent routers, or routers
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R2 1

~V J
R 1,1

Victim

F ig u re 3.1: Single Path, Single Attacker (SP/SA)

In PPM, the majority of marked packets received by the victim are from routers
close to the victim. This is because the traditional PPM marking algorithm allows
overwriting of marking information. Any marking information embedded in a packet
by a router can be potentially overwritten by another router downstream in the path
to the victim. This happens when the same packet is randomly selected by more
than one router along its journey, causing the loss of information from the upstream
routers. For any router marking to be received by the victim, the marked packet
should not be marked again by any subsequent routers th a t it passes through. The
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marking problem can be modeled as a binomial problem with success defined as being
marked by a specific router. Given th at a router is i hops away from the victim, the
probability of th a t router’s markings reaching a victim is a product of one success
p and subsequent failures (1 —

The expression Np( 1 —p)0-1) describes the

number of attack packets received by the victim, which are marked by that router, if
the attacker sends N packets th a t all take a single path. Assuming the router sent
N p packets with its information, the factor (1 —

accounts for information that

is lost due to remarking of packets by subsequent routers.
Extending this analysis to k attackers and k paths (assuming that the packets
from one attacker follow a single path to the victim1), the number of packets marked
at distance i from the victim is described by the general expression in Equation 3.1.
Hereby, each attacker j sends Nj packets:
k

J2 Nip(l ~
j =1

;

0<

- dr

(3‘1)

The Tabu marking scheme [30] provides an alternative to the marking scheme.
To compensate for the loss of information, the scheme is implemented such th a t a
packet randomly chosen for marking by a router is not remarked if it already has
marking information from a previous router. This ensures th a t information from
upstream routers is not overwritten by downstream routers. However, this guarantee
comes at the cost of losing potential marking information from downstream routers.
By prohibiting remarking, a router forfeits the chance to embed its own marking
information in a previously marked packet. As a result, the m ajority of marked
1Under this assumption, it is possible for more than one attacker to have the same path.
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packets received by the victim are from more distant routers. The number of attack
packets received th at are marked by a router i hops away from a victim in an attack
path of length d can be modeled binomially as a product of one success p and prior
failures (1 —p)(d~l\ This is because the marking from router i will only get to the
victim if the packet th at was chosen for marking has not been chosen previously
by upstream routers. The number of marked packets from the router i, given one
attacker who sends a total of N packets along one path, is described by the expression
N p( 1 —p){d~l). Given th a t each router had the potential to send N p packets with
their own information, the factor (1 —

accounts for the possible information

th at is lost due to not remarking the packets.
Similarly, for the general case of k attackers and k paths, the number of packets
marked at distance i from the victim is given by the general expression in Equation
3.2:
k
; 0 < i j < d s.

(3.2)

j =1
Conclusively, PPM schemes that allow overwriting lose information from earlier
routers, while Tabu th a t does not allow overwriting loses possible information from
latter routers.
We propose a marking scheme that loses information from neither earlier nor
latter routers. The resulting expression for attack packets received marked by a router
i steps away from a victim is given by Np for the SP/SA scenario and is therefore
independent of the distance from the victim.2
2The number of marked packets received is independent of i for most practical ranges of p and d.
We define a “saturation condition” later on in this document, where this independence fails.
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For the general case of k attackers and k paths, the number of packets marked
at distance i from the victim is given by the general expression in Equation 3.3:
J 1'
i
p Y ^ Nj', Vi,- > dmin - - .
j=1
p

(3.3)

Step 4 of the PPM traceback process is an expensive step in terms of time and
processing power. It is during this step that the attack graph is reconstructed and the
attack sources are identified. In this graph, the nodes are the routers, and the edges
are the links between the routers. The routers in the attack graph will include the
subscriber edge routers directly connected to the attackers and/or victim, and all the
routers in between. Traditional traceback algorithms seek to identify all routers in
the attack graph at distance d from the victim before identifying routers at distance
d + 1. This approach is not effective with insufficient information about routers at
distance d, because the algorithm cannot identify routers in the attack path farther
than that. Since the aim of traceback is to identify one or more leaves in the attack
tree, a missing edge is a dead end in traditional traceback algorithms. The extension
to the traceback algorithm in PBS seeks to avoid this dead end by using graphs built
using legitimate traffic. This adjustm ent makes tracing the multiple attackers of a
DDoS attack significantly faster.
The Prediction-Based Scheme (PBS) is based on two ideas and on known PPM
techniques. First, the marking routine is similar to the traditional PPM Scheme
except th at if a router selects a packet that already has router information, it marks
the next available packet with its information. By next available packet, we refer
to a packet further on in the processing queue of the router without any marking
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information. This exposes the scheme to spoofing, where attackers insert erroneous
router information because this wrong information will not be overwritten and will
arrive at the victim and frustrate any traceback attem pts. To deal with this, we
propose th at all edge routers that employ the scheme clear the IP identification field
of all packets passing through the routers, hence removing any false information put
there by the attacker prior to the packets entering the network. Second, the traceback
algorithm leverages legitimate traffic collected before or after the attack to complete
any missing edges in the attack graph and consequently shorten the reconstruction
process.

3.2 Our Approach: Prediction-Based Scheme
The proposed Prediction-Based Scheme (PBS) is based on two novel ideas to
complement traditional PPM techniques, i.e. a marking scheme, and a traceback
algorithm. The marking scheme can be used with other traceback schemes, while the
traceback scheme can be used with other marking schemes to yield improvement.

3.2.1 PBS: Router Marking Algorithm
The marking scheme is similar to the traditional PPM scheme except that, if a
router selects a packet that already has router information, it marks the next available
packet with its information. By next available packet, we refer to a packet further on
in the processing queue of the router without any marking information. This ensures
that previous marking information is not lost by overwriting. The marking algorithm
is described in Figure 3.2.
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Each router has a boolean variable that we refer to as the router ..variable that
is false as a default value. Upon receiving a packet, a router checks the state of its
router .variable and deals with the packet differently depending on th at state.
If the router.variable is false, the router generates a random floating point
number w in the range [0,1]. If this number is below the marking probability p, then
the packet has been selected for marking.
Upon random selection, the router then proceeds to check whether this randomly
selected packet has any previous router information embedded in it. If it does not, then
the router embeds its own identity into the packet and forwards the packet to the next
router. However, if the packet has previous routing information, the router changes
its own router.variable to true, and then forwards the packet without changing any
of the information in it.
If the router.variable is true, every received packet will be inspected for
previous router information. When a packet is found th at does not contain any
previous router information, the router identity is embedded in that packet, and the
router.variable is set back to false.
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Input: network packet and router.variable
/ * ro u ter.v a ria b le i s a boolean variab le with the d efa u lt value of
FALSE

*/

Output: Marked Network Packets
foreach Packet do
if (router.variable —— TRUE) then
if (packet is already marked) then
set router.variable to TRUE ;
increment distance;
end
else
mark packet;
set distance to 0;
set router .variable to FALSE;
end
end
else
/* routerjuariable = = F A L S E
select random number w where w £ [0,1]
if (w ^ P recom m en ded) then
/* packet was n o t s e le c te d f o r marking. Precom ended = 0.04
increment distance;
end
else
/* packet has been randomly s e le c te d fo r marking
if (packet was marked by earlier routers) then
set router .variable to TRUE;
increment distance;
end
else
/* p ack et i s a v a ila b le f o r marking
mark packet;
set distance to 0;
set router.variable to FALSE;
end
end
end
forward packet;
end
F ig u re 3.2: Prediction-Based Scheme: The marking algorithm

*/

*/

*/

*/
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The router increments every packet’s distance field unless th a t packet was
selected for marking. In th a t situation, the distance field is set to 0. By avoiding
overwriting, previous marking information is not lost. By marking the next available
packet, the scheme ensures that every router will have N p marked packets. Hereby N
is the total number of packets th a t pass through the routers, and p is the marking
probability of the scheme.
One of the drawbacks to this scheme is saturation. During saturation, a router
fails to find an available packet in which to embed its identity without overwriting
previous router information. This typically happens for either high marking probability
values (p) or large route length values (dj). It results in fewer packet markings for
routers closer to the victim.
An additional drawback to the scheme is vulnerability regarding spoofing. That
is, if an attacker inserts erroneous router markings into the packets before introducing
them to the network, those false router markings are not overwritten by routers that
employ PBS and arrive uncorrected at the victim. To deal with this, we require that
all routers at the edge of the network clear the marking field and set the distance to
0. In th at way, false router marks introduced by the attacker are removed before the
packets enter the network.

3.2.2 PBS: The Traceback Algorithm
Traditional traceback algorithms have two main weaknesses. One weakness
is they fail to identify an attack graph if there is missing information in the attack
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packets. If one of the routers’ or edges’ identities is absent in the received marked
packets, then the algorithm is unable to produce a complete attack graph.
Another weakness is th at it takes a large number of packets to construct the
complete attack graph. The algorithm would have to wait until it receives a sufficient
number of packets such th at the marked packets contain markings for all routers in
the path. This problem becomes worse in DDoS attacks because the algorithm is
tracing more attackers. Additionally, since the attack is comprised of more sources of
attack packets, the attacker can afford to send fewer packets from each source making
tracing back to any single source more difficult.
We solve these problems by adding a prediction component to the traceback
algorithm presented by Wong et al. [49]. This extra component fills out the empty
nodes/edges in the incomplete attack graph, resulting in traceback with fewer received
packets. Prediction is possible because internet paths are dominated by prevalent
routes which do not change significantly [37]. The prediction is done by using the
packet statistics of legitimate traffic, which can be collected prior to or after the attack.
The packet marking of legitimate traffic is used to build a legitimate graph that is later
used to fill in the gaps in the attack graph. If an attack packet, marked by a router
R ij which is also part of the legitimate graph, is received, then all packets marked
by all routers R if, I < i in between the victim and th at router can be ignored. This
is because it is possible to predict where th at packet passed based on the legitimate
graph. The traceback algorithm is described in Figure 3.3.
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In p u t: network packet
/* A ttack graph Ga c o n ta in s j u s t v ic tim node, V i n i t i a l l y ,
*/
O u tp u t: Constructed Attack Graph
fo reach Packet do
increase packet_count
if (packet contains an edge e in legitimate graph Gi) th e n
append legitimate subgraph Gt(v->e) to attack graph Ga /* G i ^ e) c o n s is ts
of a l l nodes and edges from v ic tim V up to edge e
*/
end
if (edge e is N O T contained in attack graph Ga) th e n
Insert edge e to graph Ga
if (Ga is a connected graph) th e n
recalculate Termination_Number T /* The Term inationJIum ber i s
r e c a lc u la te d u sin g a su b ro u tin e t h a t depends on th e s t a t e
of Ga . [49] d e s c rib e s such a su b ro u tin e
*/
reset packet _count
end
end
if (Ga is a connected graph) a n d (packeLcount > T ) th e n
| return Ga as the attack graph
end
en d
F ig u re 3.3: Prediction-Based Scheme: The traceback algorithm

We illustrate our traceback algorithm using the Single Path Multiple Attacker
(SP/M A) (cf. Figure 3.4) , which links the victim to four possible traffic sources. In
the figure, Source 1 is a legitimate source of traffic, while Sources 2, 3, and 4 are
possible sources of attack traffic. One assumption is that a form of PPM is employed
by all the routers R ij in this graph, where i is the distance of the router from the
victim, and j is the path linking attacker j to the victim. Another assumption is
that sufficient traffic is generated by Source 1 for the victim to have collected marked
packets from all routers

in the path linking them to Source 1. Given this setup,

our approach is to build a graph from the marked packets linking Source 1 to the
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victim and use that graph to predict where other packets are coming from. We define
known routers as the routers that are included in the graph built on legitimate traffic.

Q
r

Source 1 (legitimate)—
Rd i p s

\

D .

Router i steps away from the victim on the
ij path between the victim and source j
Link between adjacent routers, a routers
and end points

Source 2 (attacker) — » - Q - - - - - - Q

Rd2,2
Source 3 (attacker) —

\
Source 4 (attacker) —

—

Rd4,4

► Q ---------Q

Rlj
-—

*- Victim

Rd4-1.4

Figure 3.4: Single Path, Multiple Attacker (SP/MA)

The best-case scenario is encountered when the entire attack path is already
known. In Figure 3.4, th a t would be the case if Source 3 were the attacker. The
packets received by the victim in this attack would not have any unfamiliar routers
or edges embedded in them. In fact, just a single packet showing an edge between
the victim and router R m,j is enough to trace the entire attack path all the way from
the victim to the source of the attack. The victim would still have to receive a couple
more packets to ascertain th at there are no markings from routers R ij where i > m
and j = 3. The algorithm would check more packets to ensure th at there were no
markings from routers farther away than R rnj but still on the same path.
The average case scenario is when only a part of the attack path is already
known. This is just the case if Source 2 is the attacker. The packets received by the
victim during the attack would have a mixture of familiar edges (i < n) and unfamiliar
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edges (i > n). In this case, the algorithm searches through the marked packets for
any packets linking the known router

to the unknown attack source Rd2;i-

The worst-case scenario is when the entire attack path is unknown. This would
be if Source 4 is the attacker. In this case, the packets received by the victim during
the attack have unknown edges embedded in them. The algorithm then constructs the
attack path using the traditional traceback routine in [38, 49]. No prediction results
could be gained by PBS.

3.3 Simulation and Results
3.3.1 Simulation Study
To investigate the behavior of the proposed marking scheme, we set up three
different network topologies. These are the Single Path, Single attacker (SP/SA) in
Figure 3.1, Single Path, Multiple Attacker (SP/MA) similar to that in Figure 3.4, and
the Multiple Path Multiple Attacker (M P/M A ) in Figure 3.5. These three different
scenarios are chosen because we aim to describe any possible attack graph in a network.
For example, a DoS attack is similar to the SP/SA topology, while a DDoS attack
uses either a SP/M A topology, M P/M A topology, or a combination of all three. To
investigate the performance of the traceback algorithm, we additionally consider two
larger random networks which we refer to as Topology I, and Topology II.
The topologies and their operations are implemented in NS-2 [35]. Topologies
I and II are derived using the Brite Topology Generator [32], which was set up to
produce NS-2 format output for router level topologies.
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F ig u re 3.5: Multiple Path, Multiple Attacker (MP/MA)
The SP/SA topology is set up according to Figure 3.1 with the number of
attackers k = 1 and the number of nodes di = 21.
The SP/M A topology is set up according to Figure 3.4 with k = 5, di = 11
and distance to common intersection of paths m = 4.
The MP/MA topology is set up according to Figure 3.5 with k = 3, d\ = d2 =
d3 = 9, and rn = 4.
Topology I consists of 50 nodes following the Waxman model [47]. The Waxman
model is a random network construction model used to simulate the Internet-like
topologies.

In this model, nodes are uniformly distributed in a plane, and the

probability of an edge being assigned between nodes a and 5, distance d apart, is given
d

by the expression P (a,b) = ae^L where L is the maximum distance between any two
nodes [25].
The settings for this model are Waxman components a = 0.15, /3 = 0.2, and
the minimum number of links per node being 2.
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Topology II consists of 100 nodes with Waxman components a = 0.15, /3 = 0.2,
and the minimum number of links per node being 2.

3.3.2 Marking Scheme Results
We test the validity of the theoretical models by running simulations for all
three marking schemes in the three topologies SP/SA, SP/MA, MP/MA. By plotting
the number of marked packets received against the distance from the victim at which
they were last marked, Figure 3.6a, Figure 3.6b, and Figure 3.6c show th at the
experimental results agree with the theoretical models. The figures also show which
sections of the attack path produce fewer marked packets. In PPM, the routers more
distant from the victim are able to send only half as many packet markings as the
routers closer to the victim. For Tabu marking scheme, the routers closer to the victim
send fewer packets compared to the routers farther away from the victim. The sections
with the fewest packets are the sections that limit the speed with which traceback can
be executed with those specific marking schemes.
We evaluate the loss of information in the three schemes over the three
topologies. Table 3.1 shows th at PPM and Tabu deliver about the same percentage
of marked packets as each other regardless of the topology. It also shows th a t a
considerable portion of the packets is marked more than one time when PPM scheme
is employed, resulting in loss of information. Both Tabu and PBS avoid information
loss due to overwriting, but only PBS compensates by ensuring that more packets in
total are marked. In some cases, up to 78% of the packets received are marked in the
PBS scheme compared to 57% for Tabu Scheme and 59% for PPM Scheme.
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(b) Single Path, Multiple Attacker (SP/MA)
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F ig u re 3.6: Number of marked packets versus distance of last mark for different
models. This figure shows how the frequency of router markings in packets received
by the victim is dependent on the distance of the router from the victim
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T ab le 3.1: Distribution of packets, and the number of times they are marked, in
different graphs. SP/SA = Single Path, Single Attacker; SP/M A = Single Path,
Multiple Attacker; M P/M A = Multiple Path, Multiple Attacker
P a th

S P /S A

S P /M A

M P /M A

S chem e
PPM
Tabu
PBS
PPM
Tabu
PBS
PPM
Tabu
PBS

N u m b e r o f m a rk e d tim e s
lx
Ox
2x
3x
4x
40.57
43.07
21.62
68.05
69.20
63.08
68.53
69.26
63.50

37.88
56.93
78.38
26.54
30.80
36.92
26.21
30.74
36.50

T o tal

16.53

4.17

0.75

100 %

0

0

0

100 %

0

0

0

100 %

4.72

0.64

0.04

100 %

0

0

0

100 %

0

0

0

100 %

4.74

0.48

0.04

100 %

0

0

0

100 %

0

0

0

100 %

The average number of marked packets required for traceback in the three
topologies for the three marking schemes is shown in Table 3.2. When compared to
PPM, PBS only requires 54% of the number of total packets necessary for traceback
in the SP/SA scenario, 62% in SP/M A, and 6 6 % in M P/M A.

T ab le 3.2: Average number of total packets required for traceback in different graphs
P a th
Single Path, Single Attacker
Single Path, Multiple Attacker
Multiple Path, Multiple Attacker

PPM
188.74
435.36
398.60

Tabu
157.94
304.91
309.64

PBS
102.78
269.78
261.84

Even though PBS and Tabu both do not overwrite marked packets, PBS
performs superior to Tabu because it writes the information in the next available
packet. Our approach is therefore able to achieve faster convergence with just one
extra bit, in terms of space, required at the routers.
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3.3.3 Traceback Scheme Results
To investigate the traceback scheme, we consider two additional topologies
designed to resemble the Internet in terms of connectivity. All five topologies are used
to compare the traditional traceback algorithm to the PBS traceback algorithm. The
results are given in Table 3.3. To ensure th at the comparison among the different
schemes is due to the distribution of marked packets and not influenced by the
increased number of marked packets in PBS compared to PPM and Tabu, we only
consider the number of marked packets that are necessary for traceback.

Table 3.3: Average number of marked packets required for traceback in different
graphs (Traditional traceback / Our traceback scheme)
P a th

PPM

Single Path, Single Attacker
Single Path, Multiple Attacker
Multiple Path, Multiple Attacker
Topology I
Topology II

42/42
29/29
12/4
11 / 8.8
15/14.1

T ab u
39/21
1 0 /2
1 2 /1 2

5/1.6
1 1 /1 1

PBS
47/44
16/10
10/7
3/1.6
5/4.6

For the SP/MA and MP/MA topologies, all but one of the sources of traffic are
categorized as legitimate and the one remaining categorized as attack traffic. Using
the graphs built from the legitimate traffic sources, the PBS traceback algorithm is
able to decrease the number of marked packets necessary for traceback down to 2 0 %
for Tabu and 33% for PPM.
The SP/SA topology legitimate graph is set up by introducing a legitimate
source located in the middle of the attack graph. In that scenario, the PBS traceback
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algorithm is able to cut down on the number of packets necessary for traceback down
to 54% in Tabu.
Topology I is made up of 50 nodes with four randomly chosen sources of traffic.
Because of the high level of connectivity, the average path length between any two
random nodes is about 3.5 hops. Three of the four sources are categorized as legitimate
traffic and the graph built from their packets is used to predict where the fourth
randomly chosen source of packets (attacker) is located. The prediction extension
to the traceback scheme was able to cut the number or marked packets required for
traceback down to 32% in Tabu, 53% in PBS, and 80% in PPM.
Topology II is made up of 100 nodes with ten randomly chosen sources of traffic.
The average path length between any two randomly selected nodes is only about
4-5 hops. Eight of the ten sources are categorized as legitimate and used to build a
graph to predict the origin of the packets from the remaining two sources (attackers).
Because of the low possibility of common paths in such a large and connected network,
the prediction component only yields marginal improvement.
We also investigate the effect of increasing the number of legitimate sources
on the number of marked packets required for complete attack graph construction.
This is done by randomly selecting nodes from Topology II and using traffic from
those nodes to build a legitimate graphs. The traceback algorithm is then run to trace
randomly selected attack nodes for different sizes of legitimate graphs. This is done
for the simplified scenarios of one and two attackers. As shown in Figure 3.7, the
number of marked packets required to trace the attackers is generally lower for larger
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legitimate source graphs. The outliers are attributed to the worst case scenario when
the legitimate graphs and attack graphs do not share any common edges.
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F ig u re 3.7: Effect of increasing number of legitimate sources on the number of
marked packets required for traceback of one attacker (PPM1, Tabul, PBS1) and two
attackers (PPM2, Tabu2, PBS2)

3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented two enhancements to the PPM traceback
schemes. First, we present a novel marking scheme th at allows a complete traceback
with a minimized number of received packets.

Secondly, we extend an existing

traceback algorithm by a prediction component.
The proposed marking scheme ensures th at packet markings from different
sections of the attack path have the same chance of arriving at the victim. This results
in the attack path being constructed with almost half as many received packets as
previous schemes.
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A traceback algorithm has been extended by a prediction component, which
builds graphs based on legitimate traffic collected prior to or after an attack. A feature
of this extended traceback algorithm is to predict the attack packets’ paths without
receiving markings from all routers in the path.
Results show th a t the marking scheme makes it possible for complete graph
construction with 54% of the total packets required with traditional techniques. The
prediction component in the traceback algorithm also allows for complete traceback
to be possible with 33% of the usual number of marked packets.
Both techniques presented in this paper can be used independently to improve
existing PPM-based techniques.

CHAPTER 4
NETWORK DEPENDENCY OF PPM -BASED SCHEMES
4.1 Problem Statem ent
Whereas network protocols such as PPM -based schemes are designed and
assumed to be independent of the underlying network topology, the topology sometimes
has a large influence on protocol performance [38, 41]. As a result, researchers typically
evaluate network related protocols on the exact network topology for which they are
designed. Such evaluations enable the researchers to identify topology properties that
could affect the protocol’s performance. These evaluations provide insights that can
either be leveraged to yield better protocol performance, or can provide an indication
of what problems may be faced during the protocol deployment.
However, because carrying out experiments on the Internet itself is expensive
and inflexible, researchers resort to simulations using Internet-like topologies. Internet
like topologies refer to network topologies th a t dem onstrate the characteristics
exhibited in the Internet and are created using m athem atical models th a t have
been shown to describe the nature of the Internet topological structure [41]. In this
paper, we study the impact of network topology on PPM-based schemes by considering
a set of 60 distinct networks selected to encompass the variety of models in the field
of Internet modeling.
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Figure 4.1 shows six sample attack graphs derived from six different models
of networks. These models include the unit disk graphs, the Waxman model, two
Barabasi models, the hierarchical model, and the generalized linear preferential (GLP)
model [16, 47, 4, 56, 32, 13, 12 ]. Each attack graph is derived from a DDoS attack
of the same scale simulated on networks of equal size. Despite the similarity in both
network size and attack scale, the attack graphs are different in both size and structure
and consequently in convergence time. These attack graphs show how traceback
results can be very different from one network to another. Our work presents the first
step in understanding why these attack graphs are so different.
In this paper, we discuss three network-dependent factors that affect PPM-based
scheme performance. We show how these factors lead to differing convergence times
among the different schemes. We then provide a comparative study of three schemes in
the aforementioned set of 60 networks. To capture similarities and differences within
the set of considered networks, we adapt the network m otif approach to Internet-like
networks [34, 33, 28]. We use this approach to categorize networks of different models
and origins into superfamilies according to their basic structure.
This study can be used to provide more accurate predictions for both the
performance of PPM-based schemes in attack graph reconstruction, and the structure
of attack graphs in any Internet-like network.

51

(a) Unit disk graphs

(b) Waxman model

(c) Barabasi model

(d) Barabasi extended model

(e) Top-down hierarchical model

(f) Glp model

F ig u re 4.1: Sample attack graphs from networks built using the described network
models. The attack graphs consist of 50 attackers and the paths th at the traffic they
generate takes to get to the victim node (marked in red). Given th a t the overall
topologies are of the same size, these figures show significant differences in the general
structure of attack graphs, which in tu rn depends on the underlying model used to
construct the network topologies
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In the following section, we show specific attack graph scenarios designed
to illustrate the identified network-dependent factors. In Section 4.3, we show how
network motifs are identified and how subgraph ratio profiles (SEPs) are derived from
the considered networks. We also show how the derived SRPs are used to identify
super families within the networks.

4.2 Approach
In this work, we evaluate and compare the performance of three PPM-based
schemes (PPM [38], TMS [30], PBS [26]) on the set of networks. This allows us to
identify network based factors that affect the schemes’ performances in the different
networks. The identified factors include the average path length, the overlapping of
attack paths, and the occurence of network motifs in attack graphs. In the subsequent
subsections, we describe how each of these factors has a unique effect on the schemes’
convergence times for DDoS attack graphs.
Previous analytical modeling of the convergence time of PPM-based schemes
captures its dependence on the marking probability p and the attack path length
d. By using the coupon collector problem, Savage et al. [38] show th at the expected
convergence time of an attack path is bounded by the expression E[x] <

• In

this expression, the limiting term p( 1 —p)d~l represents the probability of receiving
a marking from the least likely edge. The least likely edge refers to the edge in the
attack graph whose markings are received with the least frequency by the victim. The
above expression shows th a t the convergence time decreases with an increase in the
frequency of the least likely edge, and vice versa. The location and probability of
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the least likely edge varies with the marking scheme th a t is employed in the attack
graph. We use this model to explain the impact of the network factors on the schemes’
convergence times.

4.2.1 Average Path Length
According to the model proposed by Savage et al. [38], one of the factors that
affects convergence time is attack path length. However, during the evaluation of a
scheme in a large scale network, the specific attack path lengths for all the attackers
are not easily accessible. In this case, the average shortest path length can be used
as an indicator of how long a typical attack path would be in that network, but this
has its shortcomings in terms of the accuracy of convergence time prediction. As we
show later on, this is because it is possible to have two attack graphs of identical
average attack path length, but different attack path lengths, and therefore different
convergence times.
Consider Figure 4.2 which shows an attack graph linking attackers A \ and A 2
to victim V. A \ and A 2 are located six and two hops from the victim, respectively,
and their attack paths do not overlap. This attack graph exhibits an average path
length of four hops. Contrast this attack graph with one where both A i and A 2 are
located four hops from the victim. In the new set up, the average attack path length
is unchanged, but the specific attack path lengths, and consequently their convergence
times, have been changed. We use this set up to investigate how different attack
graphs affect the convergence times for different schemes. The attack path lengths are
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varied while ensuring that the average attack path length is kept constant in every set
up.

Figure 4.2: 2-attacker V-shaped attack graph with different path lengths. Attacker
A x is two hops away from the victim V while attacker A 2 is six hops away from the
victim. Different attack path lengths have a considerable effect on the convergence
time of the attack graph

4.2.2 Overlapping of Attack Paths
The original analytical model for convergence time presented by Savage et
al. [38] assumed independent attack paths. When one considers a more connected
underlying topology, attack paths from different attackers are likely to merge close to
the victim. The merging of attack paths yields a tree-like attack graph. An attack
graph with overlapping attack paths has fewer unique edges than a similar size attack
graph with no overlapping edges. Since there are fewer edges to identify, overlapping
attack paths translate to reduced convergence times for PPM-based schemes.
While there is a general reduction in convergence time with overlapping of
attack paths, the manner of this reduction varies with the marking scheme being
employed. Consider Figure 4.3 which shows two attack paths from attackers Ay and
A 2 to victim V th at overlap for two hops. Recall that the expected convergence time
is limited by the least likely edge. In the case of PPM, the least likely edge is located
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closest to the attacker. Because the overlap of the attack paths is closer to the victim,
the overlap does not affect the probability of the least likely edge. Therefore, the
reduction in convergence time associated with any increase in the amount of overlap
is purely due to the lower number of edges to identify in the attack graph.

Figure 4.3: 2-attacker Y-shaped attack graph with overlapping attack paths.
Attackers A i and
are both six hops from the victim V , but the attack paths
share an overlapping section of two hops. The amount of overlap between different
attack paths has a big effect on the convergence time of the attack graph

Contrast this with TMS where the least likely edge is typically located closer
to the victim. W hen attack paths merge, as in Figure 4.3, the edges closer to the
victim experience an increase in their probability since there is increased traffic flowing
through them compared to other parts of the attack path. The increased traffic flowing
through the edges closer to the victim comes from all the attack paths th a t have
merged by that point. An increase in the probability of the least likely edge translates
to lower convergence times. We therefore should expect to see a sharper decline in
convergence times in TMS than in PPM.
The analysis for PPM applies to all other PPM-based schemes where the least
likely edge is located closest to the attacker [39, 49, 23]. The merging and overlap of
attack paths does not affect the probability of these edges; therefore, the reduction in
convergence time is due to a reduction in the size of the attack graph. On the other
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hand, the analysis for TMS applies to other PPM-based schemes where the least likely
edge is located closest to the victim such as PBS [44, 26].
We investigate the influence of the amount of overlap of two attack paths on
the convergence time of the entire attack graph by using a set up similar to Figure 4.3.
To do this, we vary the amount of overlap and observe how the convergence times for
different schemes change.

4.2.3 Occurrence of M otifs in Attack Graphs
Previous modeling and analysis of PPM-based schemes has typically assumed
th at an attack graph is tree-structured with the victim located at the root node, and
the attackers located at the leaf nodes [38, 49, 30, 44, 26, 23]. Tree-structured attack
graphs exhibit a single path from any given attack node to the victim node. This
assumption is based on the observation th at typical Internet traffic paths are largely
constant, especially over short periods of time [37]. However, the flooding th a t is
associated with a DDoS attack could lead to uncommon traffic patterns. An example
of such a pattern is traffic being forwarded along alternative paths in order to deal
with congestion [3, 43]. This factor should be considered when the simulations are
carried out on Internet-like networks.
The motifs of a network can be used to provide an indication of the kind of
alternative paths that can be expected to appear in attack graphs from that network.
Because network motifs represent the specific subgraphs that are prevalent in a network,
there is a considerable chance that attack graphs derived from that network will also
exhibit those specific subgraphs. However, only four of the six 4-node subgraphs shown
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in Figure 4.4 exhibit the alternative paths that would change the attack graphs from
being tree-structured, i.e. subgraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 . For example, consider Figure 4.5
which shows an attack graph linking attacker A \ to victim V that contains Subgraph
4. The traffic from A \ has two possible paths to get to V . Because the probability of
traffic taking alternative paths also depends on the flooding, we consider a varying
number of attackers, i.e. A 2 , A 3 , and A 4.

F ig u re 4.4: All six possible 4-node undirected subgraphs and their IDs. Only
subgraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 exhibit alternative routes between their member nodes
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F ig u re 4.5: Q-shaped attack graph containing a possible network motif. The traffic
from attacker A \ can take two possible paths on its way to the victim V. We investigate
the influence of motifs in an attack graph by varying the distance of attacker A 4
from the victim, as well as varying the number of attackers by considering multiple
attackers A 2, and A 3 . Motifs in attack graphs influence the convergence times of
different marking schemes uniquely, and their level of influence also varies with the
number of attackers in the graph
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4.3 Network Classification Using M otifs and Subgraphs
Comparing large-scale networks to find similarities and differences is a compli
cated problem. This is because networks can be described using a variety of attributes,
the majority of which are not easy to obtain. Additionally, the set of attributes that
describe one type of network is often different from the set of attributes th at describe
another type of network. This becomes even more complicated when one compares
naturally occurring networks whose formation has no simple mathematical formulation
or modeling.
The methodology of network motifs and subgraphs solves this comparison
problem by comparing networks using subtle structural differences while ignoring their
construction principles and other network specific attributes. The advantage of this
method is th a t it can be easily applied to networks from all fields and can therefore
be used to identify similarities between networks th at would traditionally be difficult
to compare.

4.3.1 M otifs and SR Ps
The six possible undirected 4-node subgraphs found in a network topology
are shown in Figure 4.4. Every undirected large-scale network will exhibit at least
one of these subgraphs regardless of their construction principles or attribute settings
[34, 33]. The motif and subgraph method uses the relative presence or absence of
these subgraphs to differentiate the networks.
The subgraph ratio profile (SRP) of any given network is a plot describing the
relative abundance or scarcity of the six 4-node subgraphs in th a t network. This
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plot is obtained by counting the number of times th at the subgraphs appear in a
given test network, and comparing this value with the average number of times the
same subgraphs appear in randomized networks of the same size and connectivity.
This comparison enables us to identify the subgraphs that are statistically significant
compared to similar random networks. For each subgraph i, a relative score Ri is
calculated from Ri =

[33], where N testfi is the number of times subgraph

i appears in the test network, while N rand,i is the average number of times it appears
in the similar randomized networks. As in [33], £ is set to 4 to ensure th a t large Ri
values are not obtained with relatively low N test>i and Nrand,i values.
All six Ri values for the test network (corresponding to the six 4-node undirected
subgraphs) are then normalized using the expression SRPi =

[33] to yield
v E i= i

R i

a six value SEP vector th a t uniquely describes th a t network. Positive SR P i values
suggest an abundance of subgraph i in the network, while negative values suggest the
contrary.
A subgraph is referred to as a network m otif if it is significantly prevalent in the
test network when compared with the randomized networks [34]. We use the Z-score
Zi of any of subgraph i to quantify its level of prevalence. The Z-score is evaluated
using Zi = Ntestfv r a nNrand''
[34 ] given arandi is the standard deviation of subgraph z’s
d 'i
’

occurrence frequency in the randomized networks. Therefore, a subgraph i is referred
to as a network motif if Zj > 3.0 [34],
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4.3.2 Identifying Network Superfamilies
Using the network SRPs, the networks can be grouped according to their
similarity. Similar to the cluster selection problem in data mining, identifying the
number of superfamilies from a set of networks is subjective and can be ambiguous.
Combined with a fc-nearest neighbor algorithm, a correlation map of the network
SRPs can be used to provide a rough idea of how many superfamilies a set of networks
contains. Such a map would show the level of similarity exhibited between different
networks and within possible superfamilies.
A A:-means clustering algorithm can then be used to find a more accurate number
of clusters from the SRPs. By running this algorithm for different numbers of clusters
m, and recording the intra-cluster error e(m), one is able to identify an appropriate
cluster number k using the expression k = rnin{m \m £ [2 , n\ n

< t}, where

we set the limiting error t = 10%. The number of clusters is appropriate because it
represents a trade off between accuracy and cluster size. Each network is assigned to
a cluster which then constitutes a superfamily.

CHAPTER 5
SYSTEM MODEL AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we propose an analytical model which shows how subtle
differences in network topologies contribute to differences among the convergence
times of the PPM-based schemes. The structural differences contribute to two factors,
namely alternative paths and merging of attack streams. These factors affect each
scheme uniquely and yet their level of influence varies depending on the network
topology. As a result, the performance of different schemes will be similar in one
network, and yet dissimilar in another network.
To illustrate these factors, we refer to Figure 5.1, which shows an attack stream
taking a path from Node A to the victim at Node I. In Figure 5.1a, the attack stream
takes a single route to the victim. In Figure 5.1b, the attack stream from Node A
takes two routes to get to the victim. By definition, an attack stream could consist
of network packets from any number of upstream sources, as long as the packets are
being forwarded along the same path to the same destination. However, for simplicity,
we consider the stream from Node A as having originated at a single attacker located
at A.
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1 -a

(a)

(b)

F ig u re 5.1: Sample attack paths linking attacker A to victim I. The attack path
in Figure b exhibits Subgraph 4 in which the traffic can either take path FGI with
probability a, or path FHI with probability 1 —a

5.1 Traditional Analytical M odel
Originally, the convergence time for PPM -based schemes has been modeled
as the coupon-collector’s problem [21, 38]. In the classic problem, a coupon collector
seeks to collect d equally likely distinct coupons by drawing them from an urn with
replacement. While it takes a short time to get the first few unique coupons, it takes
considerably longer to get the last few coupons that complete the entire collection. The
expected number of turns needed to draw all d distinct coupons grows as Q(d ■ln(ri))
[21 ].

When the coupon collector problem is applied to packet marking, the marked
packets are taken to be the coupons. For example, Figure 5.1a shows a single path
linking attacker A to victim I and the target of the “coupon collector” would be to
collect markings for all seven edges. However, the expected time expression above
cannot be directly applied to the packet marking problem for two reasons. Firstly,
while one is guaranteed to pick a coupon with each draw in the coupon collector
problem, one may or may not “draw” a marked packet in the packet marking problem.
This is because a sizable proportion of the packets received by the victim do not
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contain any router information because they were not selected to be marked by any
of the routers in their path to the victim. Secondly, while the coupons in the classic
problem have equal chances of being drawn, the marked packets have unequal chances
of being received. Savage et al. [38] deal with the unequal edge probabilities by
utilizing the probability of the least likely edge to provide an upper bound on the
expected convergence time.
Formally, given a single path of I hops implementing the PPM scheme with
router marking probability p, the least likely edge is typically the edge located closest
to the attacker which has a probability p( 1 — p)l~l of being received by the victim.
Given d unique markings, the probability of receiving any marking at the victim is
therefore at least dp( 1 —p)*-1, which is the product of the number of unique markings
and the probability of the least likely edge. The expected number of packets E[x)
required to complete the marking “collection” in order to build the attack graph is
derived by dividing the original coupon collector expectation by dp( 1 —p)l~l , which
yields Equation 5.1 [38]:
E o,p p m [x ] < p ^ n} d^ jTT-

(5‘1)

Therefore, the traditional expression for the upper bound of the expected
convergence tim e is obtained by dividing the natural logarithm of the number of
distinct edges d, by the probability p( 1 —p)l~x of the least likely edge in the attack
path. For the SP/SA topology, the number of hops is equal to the number of unique
markings (I = d).
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Similarly, the convergence time expressions for TMS and PBS are given by
Equations 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. In these expressions, the probability of the least
likely edge in an SP/SA is given by p( 1 —p ) 1^

1

for TMS and p for PBS. In contrast to

PPM, the least likely edge for TMS and PBS is the edge located closest to the victim1:
W

H

<

(5-2)

£o,pbs[z] < —
P

(5. 3)

5.2 The Effect of M otifs on the Analytical M odel
One hitherto unstudied factor that affects the convergence time is the alternative
paths th a t traffic might take. To understand the influence of the alternative paths
factor, we consider an attack graph containing a subgraph which exhibits alternative
paths. Figure 5.1b shows such an attack graph linking attacker A to victim I in which
the attack traffic takes one of two paths FGI or FHI with probability a and 1 —a,
respectively. The nodes F, G, H and I in this attack graph form Subgraph 4. While the
attack path length I is unchanged (from Figure 5.1a to Figure 5.1b), the probability
and the location of the least likely edge is considerably altered and, consequently, the
convergence time is changed.
The alternative path factor a is affected by a variety of factors such as the
presence of load balancing routers in the network, the number of alternative paths
available, the amount of traffic being processed at Node F, as well as the bandwidth
and latency values for the alternative paths. For the analysis in this section, we
1While PBS typically exhibits equal probability for all edges in the attack path, the saturation
condition potentially makes probabilities of edges closer to the victim less likely than the rest. This
condition occurs for either long path lengths, or high marking probabilities.
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assume node F has load balancing capability, and the routes can sustain the traffic
being forwarded through them.
Consider the case of PPM . In Figure 5.1a, the least likely edge is AB with a
probability of p( 1 —p)l~x. However, the probability of receiving edge FG in Figure
5.1b is given by ap( 1 —p), which is considerably less than the probability of AB
for short path lengths2. This means th at the least likely edge and its corresponding
probability have changed and Equation 5.1 has to be altered accordingly. In this case,
the convergence time is given by Equation 5.4:

E \,p

p m

[%]

< —
^ y
ap(l - p)

(5-4)

Comparing Equation 5.1 and Equation 5.4 reveals that the convergence time is
increased by a factor of

— . This means th at even in the best case when both

alternative paths are equally likely (a = 0.5), the convergence time of a 3-hop attack
graph is multiplied by a factor of 1.92 while a 15 hop attack graph is multiplied by
a factor of 1.18. If one of the two paths only carries a tenth of the traffic (a = 0.1),
the convergence times of the 3-hop and 15-hop attack graphs is multiplied by a factor
of 9.6 and 5.88, respectively. This shows that, for PPM, the alternative paths factor
affects short attack paths more than long attack paths.
Consider the case of TMS. The least likely edge in Figure 5.1a would be GI
with a probability of p (l —p)l~l . W hen alternative paths are considered in Figure
5.1b, the probability of GI is reduced even further to ap( 1 —p)l~x, which means the
2In this scenario, a short path is any path less than 18 hops long. This is evaluated from
{p(l —p)i_1 < ap{ 1 —p) <=> I > 18}. The limit of I is evaluated for equal chance of taking either
route (a = 0.5) and a marking probability p = 0.04.
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convergence time is given by Equation 5.5:

■

<

(5 ’5)

Comparing Equation 5.2 and Equation 5.5 shows that the convergence time is
increased by a factor of £ regardless of the p ath ’s length. This means th a t if both
alternative paths are equally likely (a = 0.5), the convergence time is doubled, and
if one p ath only takes a tenth of the traffic (a = 0 . 1 ), then the convergence time is
increased by a factor of 1 0 .
The PBS case is very similar to the TMS case. The least likely edge in Figure
5.1b is GI and its probability changes from p to ap when one considers the alternative
paths. Consequently, the convergence time changes to Equation 5.6:
E

i ,p b s

[x ]

< —— •

(5.6)

Comparing Equation 5.3 and Equation 5.6 shows that the convergence time is
increased by a factor of ^ regardless of the path’s length which, is similar to the TMS
case.
This shows th a t alternative paths reduce the probability of the least likely
edges in an attack path for all the considered schemes, and consequently increases
their convergence times. However, their impact on convergence times is higher in TMS
and PBS than it is in PPM.

5.3 The Effect of Path M erging on the Analytical M odel
Another factor th at comes into play in the convergence time is the merging of
attack streams as different attack paths get closer to the victim [49]. As a result of
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this merging, the probabilities of downstream edges in an attack path are increased
which affects its convergence time. To understand the influence of merging, consider
the attack graph in Figure 5.1b where two other attack stream s from attackers A ’
and A” contribute an equivalent amount to the traffic flowing out of Node F towards
Victim I. Because of the increased traffic flowing through edges FG, FH, GI, and HI,
there is an increased chance of receiving markings from those edges, which in turn
affects the reconstruction time of the attack path of attacker A.
Consider the PPM case. W ith just attacker A and short attack paths, we
showed th a t the least likely edge is FG with a probability of ap( 1 —p) and the
convergence time is given by Equation 5.4. However, with attackers A’ and A” , the
traffic going through FG is 3 times as high and so is the probability of receiving its
marking. Formally, given n equivalent attack streams merging before node F, the
probability of receiving FG changes to nap( 1 —p). This means th a t when na > 1 ,
edge FG is no longer the least likely edge in the attack path from attacker A. In this
case, the least likely edge reverts to edge AB whose probability is still p( 1 —p)1 _1 and
consequently the convergence time expression reverts to Equation 5.1. This means
th a t the merging of attack streams has the potential to offset the alternative paths
factor for PPM.
Consider the TMS case. With attacker A, we showed that the alternative paths
reduced the probability of edge GI to ap(l —p)l~]. The increased traffic from A’ and
A” increases this value to nap(l —p)i_1, which in tu rn nullifies the influence of the
alternative paths when na = 1. However, when na > 1, edge GI ceases to be the least
likely edge. In this condition, the least likely edge is the edge closest to the victim
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whose traffic and probability are unaffected by the merging attack streams. In Figure
5.1b, this happens to be edge EF. The probability of receiving edge EF is p(l —p)l~3,
which means the convergence time changes from Equation 5.5 to Equation 5.7:

Comparing 5.2 and Equation 5.7 shows that the merging of attack streams not
only nullifies the alternative path’s factor, but also reduces the convergence time. The
amount by which the convergence time is reduced depends on how close the “new”
least likely edge is to the attacker. The closer the new least likely edge is to the
attacker, the more the reduction in convergence time, and vice versa. In this particular
scenario, the new least likely edge (EF) is two positions away from its original position
(GI), and the convergence time reduces to (1 - p ) 2 of its original value. Given p = 0.04,
the convergence time is reduced by 8 % of its original value.
Analysis of the PBS scheme yields insights similar to those gained from the
analysis of the TMS scheme. Given a similar scenario, the probability of receiving
edge GI increases from ap to nap. As with the TMS scheme, the merging of the attack
streams not only cancels out the alternative path effect but reduces the expected
convergence time as well.
This shows th a t the merging of attack streams offsets the alternative path
effect for all the considered schemes. However, while the merging simply cancels out
the alternative path effect in PPM, it reduces the convergence time for TMS and PBS.
The model presented thus far considers subgraph 4, which exhibits two
alternative paths. Table 5.1 shows the probabilities for the least likely edges for
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subgraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 under various traffic conditions. The probabilities in the
“Original” column show the expressions when both alternative paths and merging of
attack streams are ignored. The probabilities under the “Number of merging streams”
column show these same probabilities when one considers the given subgraphs with a
different number of merging attack streams. As in Figure 5.1b, we consider an attack
graph where the different attack streams merge at the node just before the subgraph.
Additionally, the victim node is part of the subgraph and the probability of taking any
of the alternative paths is equal. While this set up is specific, the analysis obtained
from it can be used to describe the influence of both alternative paths and merging
attack streams in a larger network. The probabilities in the table reveal that it takes
more merging attack streams to offset the alternative paths in subgraphs 5 and 6 than
in subgraphs 3 and 4. This is because subgraphs 5 and 6 exhibit more alternative
paths and consequently require more attack traffic to offset the drop in probability
caused by the alternative paths. For example, with two merging streams in subgraph
4 and PPM, the probability of the least likely edge is p( 1 —p)l~l , which is the same as
the original probability. However, with subgraph 6 the probability of the least likely
edge under the same conditions is 2ap(l —p). In fact, it takes four attack streams to
increase that probability back to p( 1 —p)1^ 1. A higher probability for the least likely
edge translates to a lower value for the convergence time, and a lower probability for
the least likely edge translates to a higher convergence time.

T a b le 5.1: The table shows 4-node subgraphs and the probabilities of the least likely edge for the different marking schemes for
n merging attack streams, along side the original probability of the least likely edge given no subgraphs or convergence. T he
marking probability is denoted by p, the path length by I, the probability of taking alternative routes denoted by a, b, c, with the
expressions for PPM , TMS, and PBS shown. For simplicity, it is assumed the probability of taking alternative routes is equal.
The convergence time of the marking scheme is indirectly proportional to the lowest probability
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In summary, the model and analysis presented here shows th a t alternative
routes reduce the probability of specific edges in the attack graph and, as a result,
increase the convergence time for those attack graphs particularly for TMS, PBS and
short attack paths implementing PPM . The merging of attack streams offsets this
effect in PPM, TMS and PBS. However in TMS and PBS, the merging has the added
effect of reducing their convergence times.

CHAPTER 6
SIMULATION STUDY
Table 6.1 shows the 60 networks th a t are considered in this study, some of
their properties, and the superfamilies to which they were assigned. These properties
include the setup properties, such as the underlying model, and appropriate settings
required to build each specific network. Additionally, network specific properties, e.g.
average shortest path length and network motif IDs, are shown. Each of the networks
consists of 1000 nodes representing routers in a network, all of which employ the
marking schemes. One of the nodes is selected to be the victim and 50 other nodes are
randomly selected to be the attackers. Using NS-2 [35] as our simulation environment,
traffic is sent from the attackers to the victim, and the convergence time for the entire
attack graph is measured in packets. This simulation is carried out 200 times for
each network and each marking scheme to give a more accurate representation of the
network’s performance in IP traceback.
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T ab le 6.1: Topologies considered, their underlying model, setup settings, average
shortest path length (SPL) in hops, the network motifs (M-ID) identified in those
networks, and their assigned superfamilies (SF)
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SPL

Bar 01
Bar02

999,44,1
1997,69,2

7.05
4.13

Bar03
Bar04
Bar05

2994,102,3
3990,140,4
4985,109,5
999,58,1
1997,67,2
2994,103,3
3990,135,4
4985,93,5

3.50
3.13
2.96
6.70
4.09
3.49
3.14
2.98
4.11
3.37
2.82
2.70
2.56
4.16
3.10
2.93
2.71
2.54
7.82
8.09
9.03
9.69
9.40
7.03
8.44
8.44
9.24
10.42

Bar06
Bar07
Bar08
Bar09
Bar 10
Bar 11
Bar 12
Barl3
Barl4
Bar 15
Barl 6
Bar 17
Barl 8
Bar 19
Bar20
TdnOl
Tdn02
Tdn03
Tdn04
Tdn05
Tdn06
Tdn07
Tdn08
Tdn09
TdnlO

2048,35,0.25,0.5,1
4077,52,0.25,0.5,2
6411,384,0.25,0.5,3
7886,323,0.25,0.5,4
9800,396,0.25,0.5,5
2060,31,0.25,0.5,1
3941,327,0.25,0.5,2
6030,286,0.25,0.5,3
7742,351,0.25,0.5,4
10230,370,0.25,0.5,5
2001,19,2,500
2005,16,4,250
2007,17,5,200
2015,15,8,125
2020,15,10,100
2001,17,2,500
2004,19,4,250
2007,17,5,200
2016,15,8,125
2020,15,10,100

M -ID
—

—

—

—
6

—
—
—
—
6

3,4,5
3,5
3,5,6
—
5,6
4
—
5,6
—
—
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5

SF
3
3
3
5
5
3
3
3
5
5
1
1
1

5
1
1

5
1

5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
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Table 6.1 (continued)
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M -ID

SF

WaxOl
Wax02

1000,11,0.15,0.2,1
2000,20,0.15,0.2,2
3000,23,0.15,0.2,3
4000,38,0.15,0.2,4
5000,42,0.15,0.2,5
1000,8,0.15,0.2,1
2000,15,0.15,0.2,2

10.71
4.90
3.97
3.52

—

3
4
4

3000,33,0.15,0.2,3
4000,29,0.15,0.2,4

4.01
3.56
3.29
3.35
2.98
2.79

Wax03
Wax04
Wax05
Wax06
Wax07
Wax08
Wax09
WaxlO
GlpOl
Glp02
Glp03
Glp04
Glp05
Glp06
Glp07
Glp08
Glp09
GlplO
AdhOl
Adh02
Adh03
Adh04
Adh05
Adh06
Adh07
Adh08
Adh09
AdhlO

5000,35,0.15,0.2,5
1845,108,0.45,0.64,1
3722,135,0.45,0.64,2
5310,174,0.45,0.64,3
7424,166,0.45,0.64,4
9170,200,0.45,0.64,5
1803,120,0.45,0.64,1
3684,152,0.45,0.64,2
5235,174,0.45,0.64,3
7136,178,0.45,0.64,4
9055,210,0.45,0.64,5
3709,16,50,9.9
4297,17,55,7.9
5183,21,60.2,7.0
6252,26,65,15.4
7227,26,70,20.1
11922,45,70,9.9
13152,48,75,7.9
15790,56,80,7.0
12686,55,70,15.4
14943,65,75,20.1

3.26
14.54
5.14

2.66

2.56
3.32
2.98
2.78
2.66

2.56
15.11
14.03
12.22

10.85
9.86
6.85
6.46
5.84
6.64
6.03

3,4
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5
—
3,4
3,4,5
3,4,5
3,4,5,6
3,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
6

3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6
3,5,6

1
1

3
4
4
4
1

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

The Barabasi model, as proposed by Barabasi et al. [4], is used to create
the networks Bar01-10 with the Brite topology generator [32]. The Barabasi model
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captures the preferential attachm ent, incremental growth, and power law th a t is
observed in the Internet. The probability of any given node i being connected to
another node j of degree dj when joining the network is given by P ( i , j ) = ^ d* dk
[32] where V is the set of nodes already in the network. In Table 6.1, the networks
BarOl-BarlO are described by the settings (e,dmax,m ) where e represents the number
of edges, dmax the maximum out degree, and m the number of edges assigned for each
new node.
An extended Barabasi model is used to create the networks Barll-Bar20 [56, 1].
Each network is described by the settings (e, dmax,p, q, m) in Table 6.1 with p and q
representing the connection probabilities used with the Brite topology generator [32].
The Waxman model proposed in [47] is used to create networks WaxOl-WaxlO.
This model is a variant of the Erdos-Renyi random graph model in [11] with extra
characteristics th at are network specific. The probability of connecting two nodes is
P ( i,j) = otev1™* where I is the distance between the two nodes; i and j , lmax is the
maximum distance between any two nodes in the network and 0 < a, (j < 1 [32]. The
created networks (WaxOl-WaxlO) are described by the settings (e, drnax. a, /?, m) in
Table 6.1.
The networks TdnOl-TdnlO are created using a top-down hierarchical model
th at simulates the Internet structurally with two levels consisting of an autonomous
system (AS) level and a router network level [13, 32]. The networks are described by
the settings (e,dmax,u ,d ) in Table 6.1 where u refers to the number of AS’s and d
refers to the number of routers assigned to each AS. The routers within each AS are
created using the Waxman model defined earlier with a = 0.15,/? = 0.2.
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The Generalized Linear Preferential (GLP) model is used to create the networks
GlpOl-GlplO [12]. The settings (e,dmax,p, j3,m) in Table 6.1 are used to describe the
settings for networks GlpOl-GlplO using Brite topology generator [32].
A unit disk graph model is used to create the networks AdhOl-AdhlO [16]. In
this model, a node is connected to every node within a distance of r units by an edge
while ensuring that the ensuing graph is fully connected. The settings (e,dmax, r,p) in
Table 6.1 describe the networks where p is taken to be the clustering coefficient of the
network.
To complement our results, we also investigate three networks derived from
the Caida project [42]. Because these networks are observed in the actual Internet
and not created using any m athem atical model, we have no control over their size.
These networks are bigger, of different sizes, and not completely connected, which
means th a t their scheme performance cannot be directly compared with each other
or the other 60 networks. Therefore, we simply discuss their results in Section 7.6.
Caidal-3 are the complementary networks derived from the Caida project [42]. Caidal
has 3451 nodes and 4048 edges, Caida 2 has 3537 nodes and 4150 edges, while Caida3
has 3527 nodes and 4143 edges. The attack simulations carried out in these networks
also consisted of 50 randomly selected attackers sending traffic to one victim and their
results are averaged over 100 simulations.

CHAPTER 7
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
7.1 Average Path Length
In this subsection, we show using a simplified attack graph th a t scheme
performance varies significantly even when the average attack path’s length is constant.
We consider a V-shaped attack graph consisting of two attackers, A \ and A 2 , th a t
send their traffic to the victim V (cf. Figure 4.2). We measure the convergence time
for the considered schemes with varying attack path lengths while keeping the average
p ath ’s length constant.
Figure 7.1 shows the convergence times for PPM , TMS and PBS in five Vshaped attack graphs, which all exhibit an average attack path length of four hops.
where l\ and l2 are the distances in hops

Each attack graph is represented by

between V and the attackers A i and A 2, respectively. The figure shows th at despite
identical average path’s lengths between the attack graphs, each attack graph exhibits
differing scheme performance and ranking of performance. For example, an attack
graph of equal p ath lengths, represented by (4,4), exhibits a range of 20 packets
among the convergence times with PPM >T M S>PB S. In contrast, an attack graph
of different path lengths, represented by (2 , 6 ), exhibits a range of 30 packets with
TM S>PPM >PB S. The attack graph represented by (1,7) in Figure 7.1 exhibits a
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range of 35 packets w ith PPM >TM S>PB S. These results are more dram atic when
one considers th a t this specific scenario only consists of two attackers who are close
to the victim (less th an eight hops) when typical DDoS attacks have thousands of
attackers located up to 25 hops away from the victim.
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F ig u re 7.1: Convergence times for five V-shaped 2-attacker graphs of equal average
length, with 95% confidence intervals. This plot shows that even with identical values
for average path length, the distance of the attackers relative to each other affects the
considered schemes in different ways

In the context of a larger network, these results show that variation in scheme
performance can be expected in larger networks even if those networks exhibit similar
average shortest path values.

7.2 Overlapping of Attack Paths
In this subsection, we show how the level of overlap between two attack paths
affects the schemes’ convergence times. We consider a Y-shaped attack graph linking
attackers A \ and A 2 to victim V (cf. Figure 4.3). While keeping each attack path
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equal and constant, we vary the amount of overlap between the attack paths and
observe how the convergence times of PPM, TMS, and PBS are affected.
Figure 7.2 shows the observed results from this investigation. The results show
that there is a general reduction in convergence times for all considered schemes as the
percentage overlap is increased. Despite the general reduction for all three considered
schemes, the level of overlap affects each scheme uniquely. For example, the results
show th a t PPM and TMS are relatively unaffected by low amounts of overlap, i.e.
0-20%, while PBS exhibits a reduction in convergence times in the same overlap
range. However, further increase in percentage overlap causes a drastic decrease in the
convergence time of TMS such th at by 60%-70% TMS has lower convergence times
th an both PBS and PPM . These results show three things: Firstly, larger amounts
of overlapping attack paths translates to reduced convergence times; Secondly, low
amounts of overlapping attack paths affects PBS more than PPM and TMS; and
thirdly, medium amounts of overlapping cause a drastic reduction in TMS convergence
times.
In the context of a larger network, these results mean th at even for long path
lengths, the existence of common and therefore overlapping attack paths translates
to reduced convergence times for TMS and PBS more than it does for PPM. This is
because the overlaps, which are typically downstream, result in increased probabilities
for the least likely edges for PBS and TMS, which in turn leads to lower convergence
times.
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Figure 7.2: Convergence times for 11 Y-shaped 2-attacker graphs of equal average
length, with 95% confidence intervals. This plot shows th a t the convergence time
of the considered schemes is affected by the percentage of the attack path th a t is
common to more than one attacker

7.3 Occurrence of M otifs in Attack Graphs
In this subsection, we show how the existence of a subgraph in an attack graph
has a unique influence on different schemes’ performances. We consider a Q-shaped
attack graph th a t links an attacker A i to victim V and contains Subgraph 4 (cf.
Figure 4.5). We use the Q-shaped attack graph to understand how the presence of
alternative paths affects the convergence times of different schemes. In this scenario,
the alternative path is the same length as the original path. The tendency of network
traffic to take alternative routes also depends on the amount of traffic being processed
and therefore we consider up to three other attackers contributing an equivalent
amount of traffic. Including other attackers in the Q-shaped attack graph allows us
to see whether the amount of traffic affects the convergence times of the considered
schemes.
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Figure 7.3 shows the convergence times for four different kinds of Q-shaped
attack graphs. In each case, the path length to attacker A x is varied between 3 and 27
hops (distance of 1-25 hops from the subgraph) and the convergence times for PPM,
TMS and PBS are measured. In Figure 7.3(a), we only consider A x. In Figure 7.3(b),
we introduce A 2 at a distance of 3 hops from the victim as in Figure 4.5 and observe if
this changes the observations of Figure 7.3(a). In Figure 7.3(c) and (d), we introduce
attackers A 3 , and A 4 respectively to show how increased traffic from other attackers
affects our results. The path distance to attackers A 2, A 3 and A 4 is constant at 3
hops from the victim, while A i’s path distance is varied in each case.
Figure 7.3(a) shows the convergence times with just attacker A x. As expected,
all schemes exhibit a general increase in convergence times with longer attack path
length. However, P PM ’s convergence times are the least affected by the increase in
p ath length, particularly for path lengths longer than 15 hops. In contrast, TMS
exhibits comparatively high convergence times for path lengths longer than 15 hops.
When another attacker A 2 is included as in Figure 7.3(b), there is a general
increase in convergence times, which is due to the increase in the size of attack graph.
However, the TMS convergence times for path lengths longer than 15 hops is now
comparable to the PPM and PBS convergence times. Additionally, PPM convergence
times for path lengths longer than 15 hops is now more responsive to a path’s length
than it was in Figure 7.3(a) when there was only one attacker.
Including attacker A3 yields the results in Figure 7.3(c). While there is a general
increase in convergence times from Figure 7.3(b) to Figure 7.3(c), PBS convergence
times are considerably less than PPM and TMS for path lengths longer than 15 hops.
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Additionally, PPM now exhibits the highest convergence times of the three
considered schemes.
Including attacker Aj yields the results in Figure 7.3(d). As in Figure 7.3(c),
PBS generally exhibits the lowest convergence times while PPM exhibits the highest.
Additionally, the PBS convergence times do not seem as responsive to an increase in
path length for paths longer than 15 hops.
These results show that the subgraphs in an attack path have a higher impact on
the performance of TMS and PBS than on PPM, particularly when other attackers do
not contribute traffic to the subgraph. However, when other attackers are considered,
the increased traffic in the subgraph offsets this impact leading to lower convergence
times for TMS and PBS than for PPM.
In the context of a larger network, these results show that the effect of subgraphs
in attack graphs depends on how many attack paths have merged by the time the
subgraph is encountered. As the number of attackers increases, as in a DDoS attack,
we expect significantly higher PPM convergence times than TMS and PBS. With a low
number of attackers, the subgraphs in the attack paths lead to high TMS convergence
times compared to PPM and PBS. Additionally, networks with long average paths
should exhibit large discrepancies between PPM performance on one hand, and PBS
and TMS performance on the other hand.

7.4 M otifs and SRPs
In this subsection, we present the results obtained in the process of network
classification. We present the identified network motifs and the derived superfamilies,
as well as all intermediate results obtained in the process.
The 4-node motifs identified in all the considered networks are presented in
the M-ID column of Table 6.1. The table shows that 14 out of the 60 networks do not
exhibit any network motifs. This means that while the networks exhibit all six 4-node
undirected subgraphs, the frequency of these subgraphs is not significantly high enough
to warrant any of the subgraphs being identified as a motif of that network. The table
also shows th at many networks exhibit multiple network motifs. The network motifs
exhibited by a network provide an indication of what kind of subgraphs are likely
to appear in a DDoS attack graph derived from th a t network. For example, B a rll
exhibits subgraphs 3, 4, and 5 as network motifs. Therefore, DDoS attack graphs in
the B a r ll network are more likely to exhibit subgraphs 3, 4, or 5 compared to any
other 4-node subgraphs.
Figure 7.4(a) shows the significance ratio profiles (SRPs) for all 60 considered
networks. The SRPs can be used to show the relative abundance or absence of all six
4-node subgraphs and consequently derive the superfamilies within the networks based
on their structural similarity. The figure shows th at the m ajority of the networks
exhibit average amounts of subgraphs 1 and 2. In contrast, the networks exhibit
different levels of prevalence for subgraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 , which coincidentally are the
subgraphs th at contain alternative routes.
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We use Figure 7.5 to obtain an impression of the superfamilies contained within
the considered networks. The figure shows a color-coded correlation map of the SRPs
with light colored squares representing high correlation values, while dark colored
squares represent low correlation values. A cluster of light colored squares provides
a visual indication of a possible superfamily since the SRPs are very similar, and
consequently the represented networks are structurally similar. This figure shows
3-4 possible superfamilies. For example, the TDN networks are very similar to the
ADH networks as well as five Wax networks and could all possibly belong to one
superfamily.

F ig u re 7.5: Correlation map for the network SRPs arranged by similarity. The
correlation map shows the levels of similarity between the different network SRPs and
is used to give a visual indication of how many groups the networks can be placed into
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We use Figure 7.6 to obtain a more accurate number of clusters. By plotting
the intra-cluster error against the possible number of clusters, we are able to identify
an appropriate number of clusters. The number of clusters should exhibit a low
intra-cluster error. Additionally, the percentage change in error when one increases
the number of clusters by one should be minimal. From Figure 7.6, we deduce th at
the 60 networks can be placed into five clusters, hereafter referred to as superfamilies.
This is because five clusters exhibits a lower error than four clusters, and also exhibits
a percentage difference in error th at is less than a predetermined tolerance level of
10%. This value allows us to find a balance between cluster size and error.
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F ig u re 7.6: The cluster decision plot which shows intra-cluster error e(m ) and
percentage change in error —
versus number of clusters m. The percentage
change in error is used to quantify the benefit of increasing the number of clusters
from m to m + 1 . The cluster decision plot is used to determine an accurate ideal
number of clusters from the SRPs of the networks

The SRPs of the five identified superfamilies are shown in Figure 7.4(b)-(f).
The SRPs within each superfamily are similar to each other, and yet different from
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the SRPs in other superfamilies. Therefore, the networks within each superfamily are
structurally similar to each other, and yet distinct from other superfamilies.

7.5 Overall IP Traceback Performance
In the preceding subsections, we demonstrate the individual influence of three
topology-based factors th at affect the performance of PPM -based schemes in large
scale networks. In each of the subsections, the attack graphs are designed to illustrate
and emphasize those specific factors. In this subsection, we evaluate the performance
of selected schemes in a large set of Internet-like networks to observe the schemes’
performances in more realistic scenarios. In contrast to the attack graphs in the
previous sections, we have limited control over the shape and structure of these attack
graphs. This allows us to observe the collective influence of all topology-dependent
factors in an unbiased manner. Therefore, by evaluating the schemes in these networks,
we are able to show how all the previous mentioned factors combine to affect the
performance of PPM , TMS, and PBS in more realistic scenarios than considered in
preceding subsections.
Figure 7.7 shows the average PPM , TMS and PBS convergence times in 60
different networks, which are all the same size. Each network is subjected to 200
different DDoS attacks of the same scale under each of the three considered schemes.
The convergence times are measured and averaged to provide an indication of the
schemes’ performance in each network. Given the similarity in network size and attack
scale, the observed differences in convergence time can be solely attributed to subtle
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differences in graph structure among the different networks, and the way the graph
structure affects each marking scheme uniquely.
The first observation from this graph is th at the convergence times for all
three considered schemes vary from one network to another.

In fact, even the

ranking of performance of the schemes also varies with the network. For example,
B a rll exhibits PPM >TM S>PBS while Wax04 exhibits TM S>PPM >PBS and Tdn06
exhibits PPM >PB S>TM S. Despite the variation in scheme performance, the plot
shows th at PPM generally exhibits a higher convergence time than both TMS and
PBS.
Another observation from this graph is the difference between PPM convergence
times on one hand, and TMS and PBS convergence times on the other hand. In
some networks, all three schemes exhibit similar convergence times. For example,
network Wax09 exhibits a difference between the best and worst performing schemes
of 298.36 packets. In contrast, network Adh03 exhibits a difference between the best
and worst performing schemes of 6094.79 packets. This discrepancy shows th a t the
underlying topologies affect different schemes in different ways. In some topologies,
all the schemes are comparable in performance, while scheme performances are vastly
different in other topologies. The fact th a t TMS and PBS convergence times seem
fairly stable among different networks while PPM convergence times are erratic shows
that PPM is more vulnerable to the structural differences between different networks.
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F ig u re 7.7: Convergence times for PPM, TMS, and PBS, with their 95% confidence intervals, in 60 different networks arranged
according to the superfamily they belong to. The line plots (shown in black and purple) show the expected convergence times for
the schemes as evaluated using the traditional analytical models and the networks’ average shortest p ath values (cf. Table 2.2
and Section 5.1). The black line plot shows the expected convergence times for PPM and TMS, while the purple line plot shows
PBS’ expected convergence time. The plot shows th at the convergence time for the different schemes varies from one network to
another, and in most networks exceeds the expected convergence time based on analytical models. Furthermore, this plot shows
th a t the best performing scheme in one network is not necessarily the best performing scheme in another network
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It is interesting to note that when the networks are arranged by a superfamily,
the networks within each superfamily tend to exhibit similar scheme performances.
For example, Superfamilies 1 and 5 exhibit low ranges between their best and worst
performing schemes regardless of the fact that they consist of networks created using
different m athem atical models. In contrast, superfamilies 2, 3, and 4 exhibit large
ranges between their best and worst performing schemes. This observation indicates
that there is a link between the structural similarity as captured using the superfamily
technique, and the performance of PPM-based schemes in different networks.
The adjusted model (cf. Section 5.2) shows th a t alternative routes in attack
paths, such as those offered by Subgraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 , have the effect of increasing
convergence times for all considered schemes. However, the merging of different attack
streams cancels out this effect particularly in TMS and PBS where this merging also
reduces the convergence times (cf. Section 5.3). This leads to a discrepancy in results
between PPM on one hand, and TMS and PBS on the other hand. This discrepancy
in results between the schemes is more pronounced with more alternative paths, and
therefore Subgraph 6 has a larger effect than Subgraph 3 since Subgraph 6 has four
alternative routes compared to Subgraph 3 which only has two alternative routes. We
therefore expect to see increased discrepancy between PPM convergence times and
both TMS and PBS convergence times for networks with an abundance of Subgraphs
3, 4, 5, and 6 , e.g. Glp07-10, Adh01-10. We also expect this discrepancy to be more
pronounced with Subgraphs 5 and 6 than it is with Subgraphs 3 and 4.
Our results agree with the presented model. In Figure 7.7, convergence times
for TMS and PBS in Superfamilies 2 and 4 are generally similar to Superfamilies 1 , 3
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and 5 despite the increase in average shortest path length, while the convergence times
for PPM are higher. Additionally, Superfamily 2 shows the most difference between
PPM , and TMS and PBS, because it has an abundance of Subgraph 6 , as shown in
Figure 7.4c, and identified in Table 6.1. This result validates the model presented
earlier and shows how the motifs affect scheme convergence time uniquely.
Note that networks built from the same model can belong to different superfam
ilies, and exhibit different scheme performances. This indicates that the superfamily
technique can be used as a means to identify possible networks with similar network
protocol performance even when the networks have differing construction principles
or models. This observation calls for more research with other network protocols
to determine whether networks belonging to the same superfamily exhibit similar
performance regardless of the mathematical models used to create them.

7.6 Caida Networks
In this section, we present complementary results derived from the three
networks from the Caida project [42] referred to as Caidal, Caida 2 , and Caida3.
The SRPs for all three networks are shown in Figure 7.8. The figure reveals
that all three Caida networks have very similar SRPs and yet these SRPs are distinct
from the SRPs in Figure 7.4. The networks exhibit a lack of Subgraph 4, an abundance
of subgraphs 3, 5 and 6 , as well as average amounts of Subgraphs 1 and 2.
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F ig u re 7.8: The subgraph ratio profiles (SRPs) of the three Caida networks. These
networks are similar to each other and yet different from the SRPs of the five
superfamilies

The convergence times for the attacks carried out in these networks are
presented in Table 7.1 alongside their 95% confidence intervals. The table shows that
PPM >T M S>PB S for all three networks. As expected, TMS and PBS convergence
times are similar to each other, and yet distinct from PPM convergence times for all
three networks. It is interesting to point out th at even though these networks are
at least three times the size of the other 60, the TMS and PBS convergence times
are comparable to the rest. Additionally, PPM convergence times are comparable to
the convergence times of the networks in Superfamily 2. One would expect that the
convergence times for all schemes would drastically increase with an increase in the
network size. The link between network size and protocol performance presents an
interesting direction for future research.
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T ab le 7.1: The average convergence times, measured in packets, for the three Caida
networks as well as their 95% confidence intervals after 100 simulations
N e tw o rk

PPM

TM S

PBS

Caidal

6503.9 ± 357.54

5090.3 ± 266.61

4858.5 ± 281.61

Caida2

7126.4 ± 392.97

5932.8 ± 494.89

5689.0 ± 232.08

Caida3

6631.6 ± 391.62

5551.5 ± 347.11

5506.6 ± 231.84

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Conclusions
In the first part of this dissertation, we present two enhancements to improve
the PPM traceback schemes. First, we present a novel marking scheme th at allows
complete traceback with decreased convergence time. Second, we extend an existing
traceback algorithm by a prediction component.
The proposed marking scheme ensures th a t packet markings from different
sections of the attack path have the same chance of arriving at the victim. Additionally,
the proposed traceback algorithm has a prediction component, which builds graphs
based on legitimate traffic collected prior to or after an attack. A feature of this
extended traceback algorithm is to predict the attack packets’ paths without receiving
markings from all routers in the path.
Results show th a t the marking scheme makes it possible for complete graph
construction with 54% of the total packets required with traditional techniques. The
prediction component in the traceback algorithm also allows for complete traceback
to be possible with 33% of the usual number of marked packets.
Both techniques can be used independently to improve existing techniques
based on PPM.
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In the second part of this dissertation, we study the influence of network
topology on the performance of PPM -based schemes. We identify three networkdependent factors and show empirically that they uniquely affect different PPM-based
schemes leading to possible discrepancy in the schemes’ performances from one network
to another. Additionally, by implementing selected schemes on an extensive set of
Internet-like topologies, we are able to show the collective contribution of these
factors to scheme performance in more realistic deployment scenarios than previously
considered. Network motifs and subgraph ratio profiles are applied to capture the
subtle differences and similarities in structure between these topologies and to assign
them to super families.
Our results show a strong dependence of PPM-based scheme performance on
network structure. Our results also show that networks that are similar according to the
network motif technique exhibit similar PPM-based scheme performance. Moreover,
an analytical model is presented in this dissertation, which shows how this link affects
the schemes uniquely, contributing to the discrepancies in their convergence times
among the networks.
The presented results raise questions about other network protocols that have
typically assumed an independence from the network structure on which they are
implemented. Our work encourages multiple network evaluation of such protocols to
provide performance guarantees in large scale networks similar to the Internet. To
th a t end, our work also presents a network clustering process th a t can be used to
group Internet-like networks into superfamilies according to their structural similarity.
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A network protocol could potentially be tested in one representative network from
each superfamily instead of testing it on all possible networks.

8.2 Future Work
Possible future work includes designing motif-aware protocols and schemes.
Given that this work shows that PPM-based schemes are dependent on the networks in
which they are implemented, and more specifically, dependent on the motifs exhibited
by those networks, it stands to reason th at these dependencies could be exploited
for improved performance. Such schemes would ideally exhibit the best performance
in all networks belonging to a specific superfamily, or networks exhibiting a specific
network motif.
Another direction for future research involves multiple network evaluation and
comparison of network protocols as opposed to the common practice of analyzing
a protocol in a single type of network. Previous research assumed th a t PPM -based
schemes were independent of the underlying networks, which meant that single network
evaluation was adequate to capture and compare scheme performance. It follows
th at other network protocols should also be evaluated on a large set of representative
networks in order to make accurate performance guarantees.
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